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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves a conflict between the long standing rule oflaw in Idaho that every
property has a constitutional right of reasonable access to adjacent roadways and a recent attempt
by the City of Meridian to deny access to the state highway to property owners within City
limits. The State ofIdaho has exclusive jurisdiction over state highways, including State
Highway 20/26 (Chinden Blvd.) which passes through the City of Meridian. Although the City
has no authority to regulate access to a state highway, in order to assist the State of Idaho with
"corridor preservation" along the highway, which will make right of way less expensive for the
State to purchase in the future, the City adopted an Ordinance barring access to state highways
located within the City.
There is also an issue of waiver, as the City argued that a passing reference in a staff
report constitutes a binding waiver by the property owner's predecessor to never seek access to
the state highway. The District Court primarily addressed the waiver argument, fmding for the
City, and only mentioned in passing that the ultra vires nature of the City'S Ordinance is
irrelevant because it does not bind lTD.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Wylie filed a Complaint against the State ofIdaho Transportation Department
(hereinafter "lTD") and the City of Meridian (hereinafter "City") on May 6, 2009. Wylie is the
owner of real property located in the City which abuts State Highway 20/26 1 (SH 20126) and

1

State Highway 20/26 is also known as Chin den Boulevard.
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2

Linder Road. Wylie sought a declaratory judgment on the basis that lTD has exclusive
jurisdiction over SH 20/26 and the City's ordinance which bars access to state highways is ultra
VIres.
Wylie filed an Amended Complaint on May 11, 2009,3 and a Second Amended
Complaint on May 15, 2009, further alleging that ITD's Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
(IDAP A) entitles Wylie to obtain two access points from the property at issue to SH 20/26.

4

The City filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on June 8,
2009, pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(1), on the grounds that Wylie had failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 5
Wylie filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the State has exclusive
jurisdiction over SH 20126 and that City Ordinance 05-1171 (hereinafter "Ordinance") was an
6

ultra vires attempt to control access to and from Wylie's property and SH 20126. Wylie also
moved for summary judgment on the issue of standing. In support of his standing, Wylie argued
that a party must have a personal stake, i.e. a distinct and palpable injury, in the outcome of the
declaratory action to gain standing. Since Wylie's property directly abuts SH 20/26 and a denial
of access to SH 20126 significantly reduced the fair market value of his property, his injury
caused by the Ordinance is distinct and palpable.

R, Vol.
R, Vol.
4 R, Vol.
5 R, Vol.
6 R, Vol.
2

3

I, pp. 6-7.
I, pp. 13-16.
I, pp. 17-20.
III, p. 467.
I, pp. 25-26.
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.....................------------------7

On September 28,2009, oral argument was held. Due to the various motions'
substantive overlaps, the Court heard argument concerning the City's Motion to Dismiss,
Wylie's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the City's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment in
one hearing and then took the various motions under advisement.

8

The Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on December 1, 2009, denying
Wylie's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the City's Motion to Dismiss, but re9

characterized the City's Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment. A copy ofthe
Court's decision is attached hereto as Appendix A for the Court's convenience.
Wylie filed his Notice of Appeal on January 6,2010.

10

C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Wylie is the current owner of approximately 10 acres of real property located on the
southwest comer of the intersection ofSH 20/26 and Linder Road in the City of Meridian. The
property is zoned C-H as vacant commercial land, and is commonly known as the Knighthill
Center Subdivision (hereinafter "Subdivision,,).11
The northern boundary of the property is immediately adjacent to SH 20/26 with
approximately 650 feet 0 f lineal frontage thereon.

12

The eastern boundary 0 f the property is

immediately adjacent to Linder Road. 13 The south and west borders do not front roads.

Tr., Vol. I, pp. 1-49.
Tr., Vol. I, p. 6, L. 25 to p. 8, L. 19;Tr., Vol. I, p. 48, L. 5-10.
9 R, Vol. III, pp 467-472. Attached hereto as Appendix A.
10 R, Vol. III, pp. 476-479.
11 R, Vol. I, p. 88.
12 R, Vol. I, p. 88.
13 R, Vol. I, pp. 88-89.

7

8
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SH 20126 is owned and controlled by ITD. Linder Road is owned and controlled by
ACHD. lTD has expressly defined SH 20/26 as being a part of the state highway system in its
Milepost Logs by way ofIDAPA Rule 39.03.48.300. 14
On August 30, 2005, the City passed Ordinance 05-1171, codified as Meridian City Code
(M.C.C.) § 11-3Hl, et seq., which was established "to preserve right of way for future highway
expansions." M.C.C. § 11-3H-1(b).15 One of the specific measures adopted by the City to
achieve this end is the prohibition and restriction of access to SH 20/26 in the event the use of
the property changes to a higher or more intense use. The pertinent portions of the Ordinance
are:
11-3H-1: PURPOSE: The regulations ofthis article are intended to achieve three
(3) purposes: a) limit access points to state highways in order to maintain traffic
flow and provide better circulation and safety within the community and for the
traveling public, b) to preserve right of way for future highway expansions, and c)
design new residential development along state highways to mitigate noise
impacts associated with such roadways. (emphasis added).
11-3H-2: APPLICABILITY: The following standards shall apply to all
development along state highways, including, but not limited to, State Highway
69, State Highway 55, State Highway 20-26 and Interstate 84...
11-3H-4: STANDARDS:
B. Access to and/or from State Highway 69, State Highway 55, and State
Highway 20-26:
1. Use of existing approaches shall be allowed to continue provided that
all ofthe following conditions are met:
b. The nature ofthe use does not change (for example a residential
use to a commercial use).

14

15

R, Vo1. I, p. 29; R, Vol. I, p. 49.
R, Vol. I, pp. 131-34. Attached hereto as Appendix B for the Court's convenience.
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c. The intensity of the use does not increase (for example an
increase in the number of residential dwelling units or an increase
in the square footage of commercial space.
2. If an applicant proposes a change or increase in intensity 0 f use, the
owner shall develop or otherwise acquire access to a street other than a
state highway. The use of the existing approach shall cease and the
approach shall be abandoned and removed.
a. No new approaches directly accessing a state highway shall be
allowed. (emphasis added). 16
After the passage ofthe Ordinance on July 18, 2006, Wylie's predecessor in interest
entered into a development agreement with the City to annex the land for the Subdivision into
the City. The agreement required that the Subdivision's development plans adhere to all
applicable City ordinances. The exact wording of the clause is:
5.1.2 That all future development of the subject property shall be constructed in
accordance with City of Meridian ordinances in effect at the time of the development. 17
Another term of the development agreement incorporated City of Meridian Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decision Order, dated May, 9, 2006, which contains an
attached staff report. 18 On the fourth page ofthe staff report the following statement appears:
The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State Highway 2026) but is not proposing direct access to that facility. 19
Wylie purchased the Subdivision, and on February 24,2009, after discovering that the
Ordinance barred access to SH 20/26, Wylie filed an application for a variance from the

16

Attached hereto as Appendix C for the Court's convenience.

R, Vol. I, p. 151; R, Vol. I, p. 194. A copy of the development agreement is attached hereto as Appendix D for
the Court's convenience.
18 R, Vol. I, p. 197.
19 R, Vol. II, p. 210.
17
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Ordinance. 2o On May 5,2009, the City denied Wylie's request?l The reasoning behind the
City's denial of Wylie's request for the variance was the Ordinance?2 The pertinent language
used to deny Wylie's variance request is as follows:
1)

Granting this variance would grant a right or special privilege given that the City
of Meridian has a specific ordinance with respect to limiting access to state
highways as set forth in Section 11-3H of the Meridian Unified Development
Code. (emphasis added)?3

On May 6, 2009, Wylie filed a Complaint in the district court, naming the State, ITD, and
the City as Defendants?4 The Complaint sought declaratory relief on the grounds that the
Ordinance was invalid as an ultra vires usurpation ofITD's exclusive jurisdiction to control
access to the state highway system.
After commencement of the suit, Wylie moved for a Summary Judgment on the grounds
that passage of the Ordinance was void as an ultra vires act. Wylie's arguments were:
A) Only the State, through ITD, has control over access on roadways which comprise the
state highway system; 25
B) SH 20126 is part of the state highway system;
C) The City has no authority to control access over this stretch of road;
D) The City's attempt to control access to the state highway system through City
Ordinance 05-1171 was outside of its statutory authority;
E) Any act by a governmental entity which is outside of its statutory authority is ultra
VIres;
F) Ultra vires acts have no force oflaw and are null and void; and
G) Since City Ordinance 05-1171 was void, Wylie was not bound by the clause in the
development agreement which requires the development of the Subdivision to adhere to
all City ordinances.
R., VoI . 1., p. 88.
R., Vol. II., pp. 328-32.
22 R., Vol. II., p. 331.
23
R., Vol. II., p. 331.
24
R., Vol. 1., pp. 6-9.
20
21

25 This is a field preemption argument. Wylie argued field preemption and ultra vires below; due to virtually
indistinguishable intelTelationship between the arguments, they were both refelTed as ultra vires. However, for the
purposes of this Brief, both doctrines are expressly distinguished and argued separately for clarity.
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In the Defendants' Response Brief to Wylie's Brief in Support of his Motion for
Summary Judgment, lTD did not argue against the doctrine of ultra vires, or the doctrine's
application to the development agreement. The State argued that the City had statutory authority
enabling it to control access to the state highway system, contrary to the position previously
advocated by the State in other cases.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order/ 6 the District Court did not directly address the
issue concerning which entity or entities can control access to the state highway system. The
Court denied Wylie's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the development
agreement between the City and Wylie's predecessor in interest precluded Wylie from seeking
access to SH 20126, and therefore a ruling that the Ordinance was ultra vires would constitute an
advisory opinion because Wylie would still be bound by the agreement.
The Court's rationale, detailed in its Memorandum Decision and Order, is summarized as
follows:
A) Wylie is requesting a declaratory judgment;
B) A threshold issue for a declaratory judgment is justiciability;
C) One the prerequisites of a justiciable issue is that the declaratory judgment would
resolve an actual case or controversy;
D) In the development agreement at issue, Wylie, through his predecessor in interest,
contractually waived his ability to seek access to SH 20126 from his property;
E) Therefore, even if City Ordinance 05-1171 was declared ultra vires and void, the
declaration would not provide Wylie relief because he is bound by the development
agreement.
The Court also ruled that the agreement was valid and not an ultra vires attempt by the
City to circumvent the State's authority to control access to SH 20/26:

26

R, Vol. III, pp. 467-472.
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.....................-----------------First of all, lTD is not a signatory to this agreement and, therefore, would not be bound
by its terms. Secondly, the agreement does not limit lTD's authority to grant
encroachment permits for access to SH 20/26. See, e.g., lTD's Administrative Policy A12-01; State Highway Access Control. Rather, it merely restricts Plaintiffs [Wylie]
ability to seek such a permit. A similar conclusion was reached when Plaintiffs
[Wylie's] application for an encroachment permit was denied in a letter from lTD's chief
engineer[.] (citation omitted). This Court has been cited to no authority, nor is it aware of
any such authority, that an agreement by a landowner to forego applying for an
encroachment permit contravenes any law or public policy thereby constituting illegal
consideration. (citation omitted)?7

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Does The Ordinance conflict with provisions of the Idaho Code, I.e. § 40-301, et seq.
and I.e. § 67-6528, which provide that only the State can control access to the state highway
system, rendering the ordinance void under the doctrine of field preemption?
2. Was The Ordinance passed without any legislative authorization, rendering the
ordinance void under the doctrine of ultra vires?
3. Does the language in the City Staff Report, incorporated into the development
agreement, function as an enforceable waiver?
4. If the language in the development agreement constitutes a waiver of the right to seek
direct access from the Subdivision to SH 20126, does field preemption, ultra vires, or public
policy invalidate the waiver?
5. Is lTD prevented, under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, from arguing that the City
can regulate access to State highways?

-77 R., Vol. III, p. 471.
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IV. ARGUMENT
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court applies the same standard for review of a decision on a summary judgment
motion as the lower court:
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court employs the
same standard as used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Summary
judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter o flaw. , This Court liberally
construes all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and draws all reasonable
inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing the
motion. If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting
inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. However, if the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the trial court should grant the motion for
summary judgment. (citations omitted). Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 374-75, 3 P.3d
51,52-53 (2000).
As to issues oflaw, the Appellate Court exercises free review ofthe trial court's decision.
Bouten Co nstr. Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999); See
also City o/Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 128 Idaho 219,221,912 P.2d 106,108 (1996); Harris
v. Dep'tofHealth & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297, 847 P.2d 1156,1158 (1992).
This Court exercises free review over an issue of statutory construction, which begins
from the statute's literal words:
... [A]n issue of statutory construction, [which] is subject to our free review.
Interpretation ofa statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. If the
language of the statute is unambiguous, 'the clear expressed intent of the legislature must
be given effect and there is no occasion for construction.' (citations quotations omitted).
Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854,859,993 P.2d 617,622 (Ct. App.2000).
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B. THE RIGHT TO ACCESS AN ABUTTING ROADWAY IS A PROPERTY
RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION

Idaho has long recognized that access to a public right-of-way is one of the fundamental
components and vested rights of ownership ofland. The principle was ftrst elucidated in Village
a/Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 757, 95 P. 945, 947 (1908) by the Idaho Supreme Court:

While the public generally may have no special or particular interest in the right
of ingress to any particular lot owner's property, the lot owner has a very material
and special interest in having the public reach his property and place of business,
and in his right to go and come and carryon business and invite the public to his
place of business. It has been held by the courts that to cut offthis right of ingress
and egress would be to take the lot owner's property without due process oflaw.
(Citations omitted).
In Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 586-587, 347 P.2d 996,998 (1959), the
Idaho Supreme Court stated:
Access to a public way is one ofthe incidents of ownership ofland bounding
thereon. Such right is appurtenant to the land and is a vested right of which the
lot owner cannot be deprived without just compensation. (Citation omitted).
The rule was similarly stated in Hadfield v. State ex reI. Burns, 86 Idaho 561, 566, 388 P.2d
1018, 1021 (1964):
This court has long recognized that access to a public way is one of the incidents of
ownership of land bounding thereon; that such right of access constitutes an interest in,
and is appurtenant to, the land. It is a vested right of which the property owner cannot be
deprived without just compensation. (Citations omitted).
See also Continental Oil Co. v City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 107,286 P. 353, 359
(1930); Lower Payette Ditch Co. v Smith, 73 Idaho 514, 519, 254 P.2d 417,420 (1953); Killinger

v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 17 P.3d 266 (2000); Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,
295,328 P.2d 397,402 (1958); Mabe v. State ex reI. Rich, 83 Idaho 222, 227, 360 P.2d 799,
801-802 (1961); Bare v. Department a/Highways, 88 Idaho 467, 471,401 P.2d 552,554 (1965).
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The Subdivision, due to its contiguity to SH 20/26, has an appurtenant property right of
access to SH 20126. This access right is subject to reasonable regulation, but only by entities
with legal authority to regulate the adjacent roadways. In this case, ACHD can regulate the right
of access on Linder and lTD can regulate the right of access on SH 20/26. The City of Meridian
has no authority to interfere with Wylie's access rights to either roadway.

C. THE LEGISLATURE HAS EXPRESSLY PEREMPTED LOCAL
CONTROL OVER STATE HIGHWAYS
1. Local ordinances which have been expressly or impliedly preempted are void
The Idaho Constitution, Art. 12, § 2, provides that city or county ordinances may not
conflict with state statutes:

§ 2. Local police regulations authorized. Any county or incorporated city or town may
make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as
are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws.
Therefore, a municipal corporation cannot act contrary to the general laws ofldaho. A
law 0 f general application is, among other things, an act of the state legislature. State v. Clark,
88 Idaho 365, 375, 399 P.2d 955,960 (1965). The doctrine offield preemption is a litmus
utilized by Idaho courts to determine how the Legislature, through the general laws, has balanced
power between the State and municipal governments.
Legislative intent to preempt local control over an area oflaw can be found expressly or
through implication. Express preemption is found when a statutory language expressly disallows
the anticipated local legislation. State v. Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946).
"The doctrine of implied preemption typically applies in instance where, despite the lack
of specific language preempting regulation by local governmental entities, the State has acted in
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the area in such a pervasive manner that it must be assumed that it intended to occupy the entire
field ofregulation." Envirosafe Services of Idaho, Inc. v. Owyhee County, 112 Idaho 687, 689,
735 P.2d 998,1000 (1987). A municipal organization " ... cannot act in an area which is so
completely covered by general law as to indicate that it is a matter of state concern. Caesar v.
State, 101 Idaho at 161,610 P.2d at 520 (1980)."

Classification of a matter as either 'local' or 'statewide' is made by the nature of the
matter at issue. Those matters which are governmental or public in nature" ... are considered to
be of statewide concern, and not purely municipal or local." Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158,
161,610 P.2d 517, 520 (1980).
Acts which are either expressly or impliedly preempted are void. Arthur v. Shoshone
County, l33 Idaho 854,861-62, 993 P.2d 617, 624-25 (2000) ("A local ordinance that conflicts

with a state law, or is preempted by state regulation of the subject matter, is void")(citing to
Envirosafe Servo of Idaho

V.

County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998,1000 (1987));

See also, Caesar V. State, 101 Idaho 158, 161,610 P.2d 517,520 (1980)( "The [local

governmental entity] cannot act in an area which is so completely covered by general law as to
indicate that it is a matter of state concern").

2. The Legislature has expressly given exclusive control to lTD over state highways
Idaho Code, Title 40, confers exclusive authority over State Highways to lTD.

I.e. § 40-301 states:
Idaho transportation board - Creation - Authority. - There is established the
Idaho transportation board, which is vested with authority, control, supervision
and administration of the department created and established by this title.
lTD is vested with the power to identifY, designate, and restrict or prohibit access to state
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 17

highways:
POWERS AND DUTIES -- STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM. The board shall:
(1) Determine which highways in the state, or sections of highways, shall be
designated and accepted for the purpose of this title as a part of the state highway
system. I. C. § 40- 310(1).

(9) Designate state highways, or parts of them, as controlled-access facilities and
regulate, restrict or prohibit access to those highways to serve the traffic for which
the facility is intended. I.e. § 40-310(9).
Idaho Administrative Code § 39.03.48.000 et. seq., promulgated by lTD pursuant to its
rule-making authority prescribed under I.e. § 40-312, restates and reaffirms lTD's exclusive
authority over state highways?8 Title 39 Chapter 48 of the Idaho Administrative Code expressly
affirms the reservation ofITD's exclusive authority over all state highways:

001. TITLE AND SCOPE. - [ ... ] The intent of this legislative provision is to
prevent local control over improvements to transportation systems of statewide
importance. [ ... ]. IDAPA § 39.03.48.001 (emphasis added).

000. LEGAL AUTHORITY. - The Idaho Transportation Board is authorized
[ ... ] to prescribe and enforce rules and regulations affecting state highways; [ ... ]
to determine which highways or sections of highways shall be part of the state
highway system; and [ ... ] to identify the major transportation systems of
statewide importance which would be exempt from local plans and ordinances
[ ... ]. IDAPA § 39.03.48.000 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

100. STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM DESIGNATION. - The state highway
system consists of those major highway transportation routes designated by the
Idaho Transportation Board [ ... ] and is hereby determined to be part of the
IDAP A § 39.03.48.100
"transportation systems of statewide importance".
(emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
Title 39 Chapter 48 of the Idaho Administrative Code then provides for the
identification of what routes constitute the state highway system:
28
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....................-----------------300. EXISTING STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM. - The state highway system is
not a permanent configuration or mileage because of additions or deletions over
time. The official system description is kept current in the Department's records
(Milepost and Coded Segment System) and is available to the public upon
request. IDAPA § 39.03.48.300.
Those records specifically list SH 20126, at the Linder Rd. intersection, as part of the state
highway system. 29
The state highway system, and authority thereover, is distinct from other highway
systems in the State. Title 40 of the Idaho Code explicitly distinguishes between state, county,
district, and city systems and confers responsibility for each to their respective jurisdictions:
There shall be a system of state highways in the state, a system of county
highways in each county, a system of highways in each highway district, and a
system of highways in each city, except as otherwise provided. The improvement
of highways and highway systems is hereby declared to be the established and
permanent policy of the state of Idaho, and the duty is hereby imposed upon the
state, and all counties, cities, and highway districts in the state, to improve and
maintain the highways within their respective jurisdiction [ ... J. I.e. § 40-201
(emphasis added).

In doing so, Title 40 ofthe Idaho Code lays out an expansive defmition of what
constitutes the "state highway system" while expressly narrowing the defmition of other systems
defmed therein, including that of a "city system."
"State highway system" means the principal highway arteries in the state,
including connecting arteries and extensions through cities, and includes
roads to every county seat in the state. I.e. § 40-120(4) (emphasis added).
"City system" means all public highways within the corporate limits of a
city [ ... J except those highways which are [ ... J a part of the state highway
system [ ... J. I.C. § 40-104(1) (emphasis added).

29
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-...................----------------"Highway district system" means all public highways within each
highway district, except those included within the state highway system
[... ]. I.e. § 40-109(1) (emphasis added).
"County highway system" or "county secondary highways" mean all
public highways in a county except those included within the state
highway system, [ ... ]. I.C. § 40-104(6) (emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly recognized the distinctions between the highway
systems. See Lido Van & Storage, Inc. v Kuck, 110 Idaho 939, 719 P.2d 1199 (1986). (All public
roadways not included in the federal highway system, the state highway system, or a city street
system, are necessarily a part ofthe county highway system).
In light of the foregoing, the Idaho Legislature has expressly determined that lTD
exclusively has the duty and responsibility of regulating access to the state highway system, of
which SH 20/26 is a part. When the City enacted the Ordinance which purports to " ... limit
access points to state highways ... ," the City was acting in an area which has been expressly
preempted by Title 40 of the Idaho Code and Title 39, Chapter 49 of the Idaho Administrative
Code. According to Arthur, Envirosafe, and Caesar, supra, since the Ordinance is an attempt by
the City to act in an area which is expressly preempted by the Legislature, the ordinance is null
and void. Therefore, the provision in the development agreement whereby Wylie is bound by all
existing ordinances does not apply to the Ordinance, because its status as void means it has no
force or effect oflaw.
3. Municipal corporations have no control over roadways in Ada County
Chapter 14, Article 40 ofthe Idaho Code governs the creation of a single county-wide
highway district. ACHD is the only single county-wide highway district in Idaho.
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I. C. § 40-1406 governs the powers and duties of a single county-wide highway district

and provides in relevant part:

40-1406. Powers and duties of highway commissioners - One highway
district in county - Highway powers of cities in county abolished - Laws in
conflict superseded. - The highway commissioners of a county-wide highway
district shall exercise all of the powers and duties provided in chapter 13 ofthis
title, and are empowered to make highway ad valorem tax levies as provided by
chapter 8, of this title. Only one (1) county-wide highway district shall be
operative within a county where the electorate has voted affirmatively for the
formation of a county-wide highway district. The district shall specifically be
responsible for all county secondary and city highways and is hereby
recognized as a body politic of this state. No city included within a county-wide
highway district shall maintain or supervise any city highways, or levy any
ad valorem taxes for the construction, repair or maintenance of city
highways. No highway district included within a county-wide highway district,
shall maintain any secondary highways or levy any ad valorem taxes for the
construction, repair or maintenance of highways. Wherever any provisions of
the existing laws of the state of Idaho are in conflict with the provisions of
this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall control and supersede all
such laws. However, within the limits of any city, the city may expend city funds
for the placement, care and removal oftrees, shrubs, grass, and other plants,
which are located within the right-of-way of any highway of the county-wide
highway district. . " (emphasis added).
I. C. § 40-1310(1) provides that:

"[T]he commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general supervision and
jurisdiction over all highways and public right-of-way within their highway system, with
full power to construct, maintain, repair, acquire, purchase and improve all highways
within their highway system." (emphasis added).
Furthermore, I.e. § 40-1310(8) reads:
The highway district board of commissioners shall have the exclusive general
supervisory authority over all public highways, public streets and public rights of-way under their jurisdiction, with full power to establish design standards,
establish use standards, pass resolutions and establish regulations in accordance
with the provisions oftitle 49, Idaho Code, and control access to said public
highways, public streets and public rights-of-way. (emphasis added).
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Thus the City has no statutory authority to control access to public streets, highways
and/or rights-of-way or dictate access to any roadway in Ada County.
i) If local control over state highways has not been expressly preempted, then it
has been impliedly preempted
If the foregoing provisions of the Idaho Code and Idaho Administrative Code, are found
not to expressly preempt local control over the state highway system, there is ample evidence
indicating implied field preemption. According to Caesar, supra, a state statute which relates to
something governmental or public in nature is deemed to be of state concern, as opposed to local
concern, and when this is coupled with systematic and/or pervasive regulation in that area it is
presumed that the Legislature intended to occupy the field. See also Envirosafe, supra. Issues
which are of "statewide" concern are not local in their nature. See Caesar, supra.
The ability to control access is public, governmental and statewide in nature because
access to the state highway systems affects all travelers in the State ofIdaho. This is supported
by the fact that Title 40 of the Idaho Code delineates between highways of statewide importance
and those o flo cal importance. Title 40 also defmes and distinguishes the various highway
systems, whereby the Legislature has indicated when local ordinances regulate roadways and
when only the State can control roadways. This pervasive and systematic regulation indicates
that the Legislature intended to designate how and by what entity access to the state highway
system can be controlled.
A declaration that the Ordinance was preempted and therefore void would have the same
effect as saying it never became part of the development agreement between the City and Wylie.
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The clause of the agreement which allegedly requires Wylie to adhere to the Ordinance is as
follows:
5. CONDITIONS GOVERNING DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJECT PROPERTY:
5.1. "Developer" and/or "Owner" shall develop the "Property" in accordance
with the following special conditions:
5.1.2 That all future development of the subject property shall be
constructed in accordance with City of Meridian ordinances in effect at the
time of the development. (emphasis added).
Since a void law is deemed to have no legal effect, declaring the Ordinance void would mean
Wylie was not bound by the ordinance and therefore not prevented by the City from seeking
access to SH 20/26.
D. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES PURPOTING TO CONTROL ACCESS TO
STATE HIGHWAYS ARE ULTRA VIRES

1. Ultra vires acts are void, and equity will not uphold them
A municipal corporation may only exercise those powers granted to it by the State
Constitution or the Legislature. Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 118 Idaho 136, 142, 795 P.2d 298,
304 (1990). "All the powers of a municipal corporation are derived from law and its charter, and
no ordinance can enlarge, diminish, or vary its powers. Acts beyond the scope of the powers
conferred on a municipality are 'ultra vires' and are void." 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal

Corporations, Etc. § 180. Those powers granted to cities may be: 1) powers granted in express
words; 2) powers fairly implied in or incident to those powers expressly granted; or 3) powers
essential to the accomplishment ofthe declared objects and purposes ofthe corporation. Black v.

Young, 122 Idaho 302, 310, 834 P.2d 304, 309 (1992), citing 0 'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78
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Idaho 313, 320, 303 P.2d 672 (1956). A law of general application is, among other things, an act
of the state legislature. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 375, 399 P.2d 955,960 (1965).
An ultra vires act is one carried out by an entity that is beyond the scope of its authority.
Black's Law Dictionary (8 th ed. 2004). The Supreme Court ofIdaho has recognized a distinction
between void and voidable ultra vires acts. Village of Heyburn v. Security Savings and Trust
Co., 55 Idaho 732, 751, 49 P.2d 258,267 (1935). Voidable acts arise when a governmental

entity exercises an authorized power in a manner that violates a procedural rule. Id. Void acts
are those which are "directly prohibited by some statutory or constitutional enactment" and are
therefore void. Id. The legal effect of an act deemed 'ultra vires' is, by virtue ofthe Idaho
Constitution, null and void with no legal effect or force oflaw. Black, 122 Idaho at 318 ("That
which is void is of no legal effect, or more simply, it isn't there"). Equity will not uphold an
ultra vires act. Village of Heyburn, 55 Idaho at 752-53, 49 P.2d at 267.
2. The Local Land Use Planning Act does not grant cities control over
state highways

There is no statutory authority or case law in Idaho which requires lTD to follow the
access control recommendations of a city. The relevant statute reads in relevant parts:
67-6508. Planning duties. - It shall be the duty of the planning or planning and
zoning commission to conduct a comprehensive planning process designed to
prepare, implement, and review and update a comprehensive plan, hereafter
referred to as the plan. The plan shall include all land within the jurisdiction of
the governing board. The plan shall consider previous and existing conditions,
trends, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations for each
planning component. The plan with maps, charts, and reports shall be based on
the following components as they may apply to land use regulations and actions
unless the plan specifies reasons why a particular component is unneeded.
(emphasis added).
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(i) Transportation - An analysis, prepared in coordination with the local
jurisdictions(s) having authority over the public highways and streets,
showing the general locations and widths of a system of major traffic
thoroughfares and other traffic ways, and of streets and the recommended
treatment thereof. This component may also make recommendations
on ... control of access.... (emphasis added).
The purpose of this statute is merely to require the City's planning department to create a
comprehensive plan for its jurisdiction. The provision requires that the City'S planning
commission take the identified components into consideration, but does not confer to the City
joint authority to control public highways and streets which are under the jurisdiction of other
government entities.
In Idaho, it is firmly established that a comprehensive plan does not operate as legally a
controlling zoning law, but rather serves to guide and advise the governmental agencies
responsible for making zoning decisions.

The Idaho Supreme Court explained the role of

comprehensive plans in the context of zoning in Urrutia v. Blaine County, l34 Idaho 353, 53758, 2 P.3d 738, 742-43 (2000), as follows:
A comprehensive plan reflects the 'desirable goals and objectives, or desirable
future situations' for the land within the jurisdiction. I.e. § 67-6508. This Court
has held that a comprehensive plan does not operate as legally controlling
zoning law, but rather serves to guide and advise the governmental agencies
responsible for making zoning decisions. (citations omitted) The Board may,
therefore, refer to the comprehensive plan as a general guide in instances
involving zoning decisions such as revising or adopting a zoning ordinance. A
zoning ordinance, by contrast, reflects the permitted uses allowed for various
parcels within the jurisdiction. See I.C. § 67-6511. (emphasis added).
I.C. § 67-6508 only mandates that the City create a non-legally binding comprehensive
plan reflecting desirable goals and objectives in the present and future, and that the components
outlined be taken into consideration in creating the plan. The provision does not authorize or
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provide the City with the authority to adopt ordinances involving control of streets and public
highways which are under the authority of other government entities. I.C. § 67-6508 does not
provide the City a statutory basis to control access to the state highway system; it merely enables
the City to make unenforceable access recommendations to lTD.

3. The Local Land Use Planning Act expressly precludes local control over
state highways
lTD's expressly granted authority over state highways supersedes the legislative grant of
authority to municipalities and counties to regulate local land use planning. I.C. § 67-6501, et

seq. Cities and counties have the exclusive authority to plan, control and regulate the zoning and
use of property within their jurisdiction. However, despite the grant of authority to cities and
counties to regulate the land use within its borders, the Legislature enacted an exception to this
authority as it applies to lTD. I.e. § 67-6528 states in pertinent part:

Applicability of ordinances. - The state of Idaho, and all its agencies, boards,
departments, institutions, and local special purpose districts, shall comply with all
plans and ordinances adopted under this chapter unless otherwise provided by
law. In adoption and implementation of the plan and ordinances, the governing
board or commission shall take into account the plans and needs of the state of
Idaho and all agencies, boards, departments, institutions, and local special purpose
districts. The provisions of plans and ordinances enacted pursuant to this chapter
shall not apply to transportation systems of statewide importance as may be
determined by the Idaho transportation board .... (emphasis added).
This exception is of great importance and significance to lTD. lTD's Board, under its
rule-making authority prescribed under I. e. § 40-312, enacted and adopted a specific rule and
regulation acknowledging and interpreting this limitation the land use authority of cities and
counties to state highways:
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001. TITLE AND SCOPE. - [ ... J The intent of this legislative provision is to
prevent local control over improvements to transportation systems of statewide
importance. [... J, IDAPA § 39.03.48.001.
In Roberts v. Transportation Dept., 121 Idaho 727, 827 P.2d 1178 (Ct. App.1991), the
Idaho Court of Appeals held that lTD could not delegate its legislatively granted authority,
expressly provided by statute, absent a clearly manifested expression to the contrary in order to
escape liability. Even though the facts and circumstances involved in Roberts are not on point,
the Court of Appeals interpretation of the express statutory duties and responsibilities oflTD
plainly acknowledges that it is exclusive and cannot be delegated to other government agencies.
The Legislature has provided no grant of authority to the City to pass ordinances which
purport to control access to state highways, including SH 20/26. Furthermore, the Legislature
has expressly and unambiguously conferred exclusive authority over state highways to ITD?O
Since the Ordinance was enacted without any statutory authorization, it is ultra vires. In
accordance with Alpert, Black, and Village of Heyburn, it was not an act which suffered from
procedural inftrmity, making it voidable. The Ordinance was enacted without any statutory
authorization and is therefore void and never had any legal affect.
The District Court held that the development agreement is not ultra vires, because: 1) the
agreement was not signed by lTD, therefore it does not bind lTD; 2) the agreement does not limit
lTD's authority to grant access permits; and 3) the agreement is not against public policy.31

30 This analysis one. § 67-6528 directly applies to the both the doctrine of field preemption and ultra vires, in that
the Idaho Legislature expressly precludes local control over the state highway system. It also applies to Wylie's
ultra vires argument, in that it evinces a lack of authority to act in manner whereby the City can control access to the
state highway system.
31
R., Vol. III, p. 471.
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......----------------------

~

The tenns of the development agreement are ultra vires because the City has no
legislative power to control access to state highways, but through the Ordinance, it has control
over access to state highways because the Ordinance requires all abutting property owners to
forebear their access rights. Even in instances where lTD grants an access permit to a property
owner, the City can use the development agreements to preclude the owners from exercising
their access rights.
Even though lTD is not bound by the contracts or the Ordinance, all property owners are
bound, and through agreements that lTD did not sign, the City can control access to state
highways even when lTD issues an access permit. The fact that lTD is not a party to these
agreements is the very reason why they are ultra vires?2
E. THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN A
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO SEEK ACCESS TO STATE HIGHWAY 20/26

A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is a voluntary act and
implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some right or
advantage which the party might at the party's option have demanded and insisted upon. Crouch
v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364,368,304 P.2d 646,649 (1956). See also, Stoddard v. Hagadone
Corp., 147 Idaho 186,191,207 P.3d 162,167 (2009).
Waiver cannot be found unless the party waiving a right unequivocally indicates such
intent.
The question of waiver is mainly a question of intention, which lies at the foundation of
the doctrine. Waiver must be manifested in some unequivocal manner, and to operate as
such it must in all cases be intentional. There can be no waiver unless so intended by one
party and so understood by the other, or one party has so acted as to mislead the other and
32

The public policy issue is dealt with below.
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....................-----------------is estopped thereby. (citations omitted). City of Coeur d'Alene v. Spokane &1.E.R. Co.,
31 Idaho 160, 166, 169 P. 930,931 (1917)
The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order cites the following language to
support the proposition that Wylie's predecessor in interest contractually waived the right to seek
access from the Subdivision to SH 20/26.
The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State Highway 2026) but it is not proposing direct access to that facility. 33
The Court held that the preceding language functioned as an unambiguous commitment to never
seek direct access from the Subdivision to SH 20/26. The Court held that Wylie's predecessor in
interest contractually waived the right to ever seek direct access to SH 20/26.
Even if the language in the agreement was given its full effect, it merely indicates that
Wylie's predecessor in interest was not requesting direct access to SH 20/26 at the time the
development agreement was executed. There is no indication that Wylie's predecessor in
interest agreed not to seek access in the future. In fact, the language in question did not appear
in the actual body of the agreement. According to the Court:
By its terms, the agreement incorporates the City of Meridian Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decision & Order for the city council hearing of May 9,2009.
See Development Agreement AZ 06-006 p. 2 sec. 1.7. The City of Meridian Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision & Order p. 3 sec. F. The included staff report
provides: "The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State
Highway 20-26) but it is not proposing direct access to that facility. 34

33

34

R, Vol. III, p. 470.
R, Vol. III, p. 470.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 29

The statement contained in the Staff Report does not constitute a promise made by
Wylie's predecessor in interest which was the result of the bargaining process. 35
The development agreement which Wylie's predecessor in interest signed references the
City's Findings of Fact, which references a Staff Report, wherein the City's staff indicated that
Wylie's predecessor in interest had not sought direct access to SH 20/26. A staff report, by its
very nature, is a descriptive document explaining the factual background relating to the property
subject to the agreement. The statement does not contain evidence of any intent to prevent a
party from seeking access in the future, nor does it contain evidence promises were made by the
property owner to forgo actions in the future. There is simply no evidence in the record that
Wylie's predecessor in interest entered into any agreement or made any promise never to seek
access to SH 20/26. The Staff Report only indicated that at the time the agreement was entered,
Wylie's predecessor in interest had not applied to lTD for direct access to SH 20126 and did not,
at that time, propose direct access to the highway.
The clause relied upon does not even use the words waiver or forbear, and it evinces no
future intent to forgo seeking access. Furthermore, since the record is entirely bereft of any
agreement or statement of Wylie's predecessor in interest agreeing to give up the right to seek
direct access to SH 20/26 in the future, summary judgment was not appropriate. At a minimum,
evidence should be adduced to establish a waiver or demonstrate that there was no waiver.

35 If deemed a ternl of the contract, the implied waiver contained in the Staff Report would fail for lack of
consideration. See Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79,81,437 P.2d 32, 34 (1968) ("Mere forbearance without any
request to forbear, or circumstances from which an agreement of forbear [sic] may be implied, is not a consideration
which will support a promise") (citation omitted).
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According to Crouch, Spokane & I.E.R. Co, and Stoddard, waiver must be established by
an unequivocal act where it can be inferred that both parties agreed to waive a right. The
language used by the District Court to fmd waiver does not indicate that either party understood
the agreement to precluded Wylie's predecessor in interest from seeking direct access to
Highway 20126 in the future. The language only passively indicates that at the time the Staff
Report was written direct, access was not being proposed.
At a minimum, the facts in the record on the point of waiver are so bare that they should
be construed in Wylie's favor, since the City sought summary judgment. On remand the Court
could consider factual evidence to determine whether a waiver occurred or not.
F. THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER CANNOT BE UNTILIZED BY THE CITY TO
CIRCUMVENT THE STATE'S CONTROL OVER THE STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM
1. The doctrine of field preemption cannot be contractually waived

When a waiver of a public right is contained in a contract that was entered into based
solely on an ordinance which is later found to be void under the doctrine offield preemption, the
specific contractual provision containing the waiver is also void.
Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. City of Seattle, 437 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2006), is both legally and

factually on point. In that case, the City of Seattle entered into two contracts with Olympic Pipe
Line Co., whereby the latter was to provide Seattle safety oversight of a hazardous liquid
pipeline located within Seattle's boundaries. After a section of the pipeline burst, killing three
people, Seattle declined to renew the contracts unless Olympic Pipe complied with a list of
Seattle's safety demands.
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Olympic Pipe declined to adhere to Seattle's list of safety requirements, and filed suit for
injunction and declaratory relief, asserting that even though the franchise agreement between
Olympic Pipe and Seattle included safety provisions, those provisions where preempted by a
federal law commonly referred to as the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of2002 ("PSA"), 49
U.S.C. § 60101 et seq. The District court ruled in favor of Olympic Pipe and Seattle appealed
the issue to the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, Seattle argued that Olympic waived its right to argue that the safety
regulations are preempted when it entered into the contracts at issue. The Ninth Circuit ruled:
Seattle contends that, by entering into these agreements, Olympic knowingly and
voluntarily consented to the City's regulations and waived its right to argue that the
regulations are preempted by the PSA.
We reject Seattle's assertion that Olympic ''waived'' its right to advance a preemption
argument. Federal preemption is the allocation of power and decision-making authority
between the federal government and the state and local governments, based on the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,22 U.S. 1,211,
6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (stating that federal supremacy demands that state laws that "interfere
with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress ... must yield"). Preemption is a power of
the federal government, not an individual right of a third party that the party can ''waive.''
Olympic could not, therefore, waive a right that it did not possess. Olympic Pipe Line,
437 F.3d at 882-83.
Ifthis Court concludes that the agreement contains a valid waiver ofthe right to seek
direct access to SH 20126, then, in accordance with Olympic Pipe Line, the waiver is void,
because the law of contracts cannot be used to circumvent field preemption. Preemption is the
power of the State ofIdaho, and not an individual right ofa third party. Therefore, the waivers
in the agreement are not enforceable.
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2. The doctrine of ultra vires cannot be contractually waived
Ultra vires acts cannot be ratified by a municipal corporation subsequent to their passage.

Benjamin Horn v. Mayor and city Council of Baltimore, 30 Md. 218, 1869 WL 3417, at 3 (Md.
1869); See also, City of Unionville v. Martin, 95 Mo.App. 28, 68 S.W. 605, 607 (1902) (It is well
settled law that municipal corporations cannot ratity unauthorized acts that are not within the
scope of their general powers); Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 6A § 31.05[3][f], at 40, 3rd ed.
("A municipal corporation cannot ratify an act for which it lacked authority, though, nor may it
ratify an act performed under a law that has been declared void"); 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Etc. § 460 ( ... "[A] contract cannot be ratified when a municipal corporation has no
original power to enter into it, or when the contract is invalid because it is a violation oflaw");

State v. Baltimore City Dept. of Rec. and Parks, 166 Md.App. 33,43, 887 A.2d 64, 70 (2005)
("The rule is equally rigid regarding allegations of contract ratification by the municipality.
'Ratification of a void contract may occur only ifthe authority empowered by charter or statute
to make the contract subsequently performs the prescribed acts of authorization"') (citations
omitted).
If a contract with a municipal corporation is void, no subsequent agreement or consent
judgment can validate the void provision. State v. Baltimore City Dept. of Rec. and Parks, 166
Md.App. 33, 47, 887 A.2d 64,72 (2005) " ... [T]he consent judgment here is void and
unenforceable, because it is based on the ultra vires settlement agreement between the
Commission and the City. 'To hold otherwise would be to insulate [illegal] municipal contracts
from review ... '" (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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--............-------------------thus dedicated to the irrigation of lands within the district could not be supplied to lands outside
of the district so long as it was needed for the proper irrigation of lands within the district.
Finding it significant that to hold otherwise could defeat the will ofthe legislature that the water
remain within the control and jurisdiction of the district, the Court again held that a government
entity cannot accomplish by contract what it cannot do by law: "a contract, which would obligate
an irrigation district to deliver water for use outside the district is ultra vires and void, and that
estoppel cannot be invoked in aid of such a contract." Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
Black, supra, is also on point. In Black, the family purchased part of a block in the City

of Ketchum, Idaho. The Black's parcel was bisected by an alley. The Blacks intended to
purchase a hotel on the property and subsequently applied to the Ketchum Planning and Zoning
Commission for vacation of the portion ofthe alley that ran through their parcel.
Various zoning meetings were held and an agreement between the Blacks and the City of
Ketchum was memorialized by Ordinance Number 471. One of the terms of this agreement gave
the City of Ketchum a right ofreversion ifthe Blacks were unable to obtain a certificate of
occupancy by a certain date. On the same day that Ordinance 471 was passed, the Blacks signed
an estoppel affidavit which provided that the conditions of the ordinance were acceptable and the
Blacks would not challenge the conditions. The Blacks later submitted a new development plan,
which was subsequently rejected by the City of Ketchum. In response to the City'S rejection, the
Blacks filed a complaint alleging that the requirement they sign the estoppel affidavit and the
right 0 f reversion were both ultra vires acts.
On appeal from the district court, the Idaho Supreme Court held that these two conditions
to the ordinance were ultra vires based on an interpretation ofI.C. § 50-311, which provides the
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method for municipal corporations to follow in the process of vacating alleys. In applying the
rules from 0 'Bryant and Alpert, supra, the Supreme Court held as follows:
The two conditions that the City of Ketchum imposed upon vacation of the alley, as well
as the right of reversion should a certificate of occupancy not be issued, are not expressly
granted powers, fairly implied powers from the clear language ofI.C. § 50-311, nor are
they powers essential to the vacation of the alley. The only condition that I.C. § 50-311
allows upon a finding of expedience for the public good is that the vacation cannot impair
"the right of way, easements and franchise rights of any lot owner or public utility." I.C.
§ 50-311. Thus, the two above-listed conditions, as well as the right of reversion, are
ultra vires acts by the City of Ketchum because they conflict with I.C. § 50-311. Black at
31 0 (citation omitted).
Since the conditions imposed by the City of Ketchum were not acts which the City was
authorized to engage in, they were deemed null and void as ultra vires. It is important to note
that the Blacks signed an estoppel affidavit, which is an agreement whereby they agreed they
would not contest the conditions contained in the ordinance. Despite the Blacks' express
agreement, the Court did not raise [md issue ofwaiver, ratification, or estoppel. The inference
which can be drawn is that ultra vires acts are void, as if they never existed. Therefore, any
contractual provision entered into on reliance on an ultra vires ordinance cannot function as a
basis for a claim of waiver because the void provision never becomes part ofthe contract.
An application of the rules set forth in Lloyd, Jones, and Black to this case leads to the
conclusion that the agreement, which the City had no power to make, is ultra vires and therefore
not binding on Wylie. All three cases contained contracts which various government entities had
no authority to enter into. Even though the equitable doctrine of estoppel was raised in some of
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.....................-----------------the cases, all the contracts at issue were voided. Likewise, any contract whereby the City
purports to control access to the state highway system is also void. 36
3. The public policy of uniform access standards to state highways precludes
waiver
Whether a contract is against public policy is a question oflaw for the court, to be
determined from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276,
283, 240 P.2d 833, 837 (1952). "Public policy may be found and set forth in the constitution or
in the statutes, or where it is found in neither it is sometimes set forth by judicial decision." Id.
at 287,840. "A party to a contract, void as against public policy, cannot waive its illegality .... "
Id. at 290, 842.

The public policy at issue here is not an agreement not to seek access, it is the ability of
the City to require property owners in annexation agreements to adhere to an ordinance which
prevents the property owner from seeking access to the state highway system. The effect is that
the City is controlling access to the state highway system. That violates the public policy
expressly contained in IDAPA 39.03.48.001 "[ ... ] The intent of this legislative provision is to
prevent local control over improvements to transportation systems of statewide importance.

[.... J" Allowing the City to control access to the state highway system, would violate the grant of
authority in this area to the State ofIdaho.
The strong public policy of uniform control over large projects was echoed by the Ninth
Circuit in Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. City of Seattle, 437 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2006), supra, where
36 In Black and under I.e. § 50-311 the City of Ketchum had the express grant of statutory authority to abandon
alleys as long as its decision was supported by a finding that it was in the public good. Even though the City had a
general grant of power to act in an area, that grant was construed narrowly against dle City of Ketchul11. Here, dle
City has no grant of statutory authority to control access to the state highway system.
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after holding that a private party cannot contractually waive their ability to challenge a contracts
validity under a theory offield preemption, the Court went on to resolve an argument based on
public policy. Specifically, Seattle argued that "by determining that the City's pipeline safety
demands are unenforceable, we will encourage Olympic and other pipeline companies to agree to
future contracts to safety provisions that the companies do not intend to honor." Olympic Pipe

Line, 437 F.3d at 883. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
We disagree. It is not our function to establish public policy in this area. Rather, Congress
has selected the applicable public policy. It has chosen, through the express preemption
provision of the PSA, clearly to preclude Seattle from imposing safety regulations on
Olympic.
Moreover, it is not apparent that the City's public policy solution is the best one overall.
Although a sound public policy might normally discourage companies from entering into
contracts that they do not intend to honor, that policy concern is more than balanced by
the superordinate federal need to maintain the PSA's policy of providing national
uniformity in the establishment and enforcement of hazardous liquid pipeline safety
regulations. As the court in Williams Pipe Line Co. v. City of Mounds View stated:
Hazardous liquid pipelines run through 21 states, and presumably through small
and large plots ofland belonging to vast numbers of persons. Were each of these
landowners entitled to demand compliance with their own safety standards, the
clear Congressional goal of a national standard for hazardous liquid pipeline
safety would be thwarted.
(citation omitted). Accordingly, we do not fmd the City's public policy argument to be
persuasive. Olympic Pipe Line, 437 F.3d at 883.
From the preceding holding two points can be distilled. First, legislative decisions to
preempt inferior governmental bodies from legislating in a specific field are legislative public
policy decisions. Second, the need for uniform control over large projects which stretch over
many jurisdictions is a public policy decision.
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The declaration by the State that local governments should not control access to the state
highway system is a public policy decision deserving of judicial deference. Allowing the City to
enter into contracts which effectively allow local governments to control access to the state
highway system is in direct contravention of this public policy.
Furthermore, like the pipelines which run through 21 states, the state highway system
runs through every county and almost every city in the State ofIdaho. There is a strong public
policy which demands uniform control over these roadways is administered at the State, rather
than the local level.
G. lTD SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ARGUING A POSITION WHICH
CONTRADICTS THAT TAKEN IN PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS
The doctrine of judicial estoppel was adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Loomis v.
Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954). "As stated in Loomis, ... a party litigant cannot
obtain a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party, and thereafter, by repUdiating its
former allegations or statements, or both, be permitted to attempt a recovery or a right against
another, arising out ofthe same transaction or subject matter." Wolford v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho
1062, 1075,695 P.2d 1201,1214 (1984) citing Loomis at 93-94. See also PHH Mortg. Services
Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 638, 200 P.3d 1180,1187 (2009) ("Judicial estoppel prohibits
a party from taking a position in one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a
subsequent proceeding).
Judicial estoppel applies when "a litigant, by means of sworn statements, obtains a
judgment or advantage over another party," Smith v. US.R. V Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 795,
800, 118 P.3d 127,132 (2005), but "[t]he doctrine in no sense depends upon prejudice to the
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......................---------------party invoking it. Upon the contrary it rests solely on public policy which exalts the sanctity of
the oath." Wolford, 107 Idaho at 1077. 37 The doctrine is intended to prevent a litigant from
playing fast and loose with the courts and to prevent abuse ofthe judicial process by deliberately
shifting positions to suit the exigencies of a particular action. McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,
153, 937 P.2d 1222,1227 (1997).
The doctrine of estoppel may be applied in cases involving highway districts. Dalton

Highway Dist. of Kootenai County v. Sowder, 88 Idaho 556, 561,401 P.2d 813,815 (1965).
In its oral argument and Memorandum opposing Wylie's Motion for Summary Judgment,
lTD asserted that it does not have exclusive [mal authority over access rights to state highways. 38
However, it has alleged precisely the opposite in the following instances:
In Moody v. Idaho Transportation Dept. (2004),39 lTD advocated: "lTD has sole
authority over the grant or denial of access to a state highway.,,4o In support ofthis position, the
State offered the Court several arguments:
a)

I.e. § 40-310(9) grants lTD "specific authority to regulate, restrict and prohibit
access to state highways.,,41

b) "The Local Land Use Planning Act does not provide for state highway
encroachments. The Act generally divorces itself from state highway issues in two
respects. First, with respect to the transportation component of comprehensive
plans and zoning ordinances are limited to "[a]n analysis prepared in coordination
with the local jurisdiction(s) having authority over the public highways and
streets". Idaho Code, Section 67-6508. Obviously lTD is not a local jurisdiction,
37 See also Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 900, 204 P.3d 532, 540 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The policies
underlying judicial estoppel are general considerations of orderly administration of justice and regard for the
dignity of judicial proceedings").
38

Tr. Vol. I, p. 33, L. 16 to 24

39Moody v. Idaho Transportation Dept., In the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho In
and For the County of Ada, Case No.: CV-OC-0509501. R, Vol. II, pp. 351-383.
40 R, Vol. II, p. 364.
41
R, Vol. II, p. 365.
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...................-------------------and thus, any transportation component of a comprehensive plan or zoning
ordinance would be limited to local roads.
"Second is the counterpart to above, and that is Idaho Code, Section 67 -6528
provides:
'The provisions of plans and ordinances enacted pursuant to this chapter
shall not apply to transportation systems of statewide importance as may
be determined by the Idaho transportation board.'
"In 1989, lTD adopted IDAPA 39.03.48 which interpreted this section of the code
with, ''The intent of this legislative provision is to prevent local control over
improvements to transportation systems 0 f statewide importance." IDAP A
39.03.48.00l. The rule goes on to provide that all sections of state highways are
transportation systems of statewide importance, and that lTD supports local
ordinances that "are beneficial to the state highway system." IDAPA
42
39.03.48.200.
In Willowbrook Development v. Idaho Transportation Dept. (2007),43 an administrative
hearing, lTD took the position that pursuant to legislative mandate, as of August 2001, "the
Idaho Transportation Board unequivocally said that it had the authority to set the current access
control requirements of all segments of the state highway system .... ,,44 The hearing officer in
Willowbrook therefore submitted his Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Recommended
Order wherein the hearing officer held: "The Idaho Transportation Board has clear authority
from the Idaho legislature to control encroachments within or onto the State Highway System
right-of-ways.,,45 That reason was among those relied upon by the hearing officer in support of
his recommendation to the Director that Willowbrook Development be denied its variance
request. 46 In accordance, a fmal order was issued pursuant thereto.

42

47

R., Vol. II, pp. 365-66.
Willowbrook Development v. Idaho Transportation Dept., BEFORE THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT. R., Vol. II, p. 394 through R. Vol. III, p. 414.
44
R., Vol. III, p. 413.
45
R., Vol. III, p. 418.
46
R., Vol. III, p. 427

43
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............----------------------City of Eagle v. Idaho Transportation Dept. (2004),48 was an administrative hearing

before ITD, where lTD took the position that it had sole authority to deny the City of Eagle' s
application to build an intersection under lTD's contro1. 49 Therefore, Judge McKee issued his
Decision and Order on Appeal, holding "For the reasons stated in open court on May 17, 2004,

this Court fmds that the Idaho Transportation board had the proper authority and was within its
discretion in denying the Petitioners a right-of-way encroachment permit for an intersection on
the Eagle Alternative. ,,50
lTD should be judicially estopped from arguing contrary positions. In previous litigation,
lTD argued that it enjoys sole access control over state highways to the exclusion oflocal
authorities. It obtained judgment over those local authorities as well as private landowners
seeking access rights to state highways. In the hearing below, lTD contended that it does not
enjoy sole access control over state highways. 51 This position is in direct opposition to that
which lTD has taken in Moody, Willowbrook Development, and City of Eagle, supra.
The policies of orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial
proceedings underlying judicial estoppel are applicable in this case. By taking one position in
previous proceedings and another in the current proceeding, lTD's conduct is a direct affront to
judicial fairness.

47

R, Vol. III, pp. 431-51.
City of Eagle v. Idaho Transportation Dept., In the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho In and For the County of Ada, Case No.: CV-OC-0302129D (2004). R, Vol. III, pp. 453-64.
49
R, Vol. III, pp. 453-63.
50
R Vol. III, p. 465-466.
51
See Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, L. 10 through p. 35, L. 11.
48
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...............------------------------V. CONCLUSION
The right of access is a constitutionally protected property right which cannot be
interfered with by a governmental entity lightly or without authority. In the context of state
highways, the power to regulate access rights been exclusively allocated to lTD. lTD and
ACHD are the only two entities with the power to regulate access in Ada County. Despite this,
the City of Meridian enacted an ordinance which bars all access to state highways from
properties located within the city limits. In taking this action, the City has deprived Wylie of a
protected property right with no authority to do so. Instead of fulfilling its statutory duty to
control access to state highways, lTD has abdicated its duty and contradicted its previous
position by advocating that the City can control state highways. The reason may be that the City
Ordinance was expressly designed to serve and assist ITD by making right of way more
affordable along state highways. This violates the constitutional protections for both property
rights, including access and just compensation in the event of a taking to widen the highway.
The District Court, on a record virtually bereft of evidence that Wylie's predecessor has
contractually waived his right to seek access, summarily ruled in favor of the City. The District
Court framed the issue as Wylie's individual ability to seek access, but the real issue is the City's
ability to circumvent the Idaho Code through either the Ordinance or the law of contracts.
When a municipal government enacts an ordinance without any authorization and in
contravention of the Idaho Code, it is void. It cannot be resurrected through the law of contracts.
The District Court's position that the development agreement does not bind lTD because lTD did
not sign the agreement illustrates the problem. Through development agreements, the City has
taken control over access to state highways, which there is no legislative basis to allow. ITD is
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...............----------------------the sole body with the power to regulate access to the state highway system. lfITD wants to
regulate Wylie's access rights or deny access, it can, but the City cannot. Wylie deserves to have
the entity with authority regulate his rights, not a third party.
The City's actions are contrary to several public policies. There is a strong public policy
for uniform control over state highways, stated by the Legislature when it expressly preempted
the field. Another public policy is based on ultra vires, and the concept that our society is
fundamentally based on the rule of law. Government power is granted by the people to the State.
The government can only act within the scope of its grant of power. Further, it would be bad
public policy to allow the City to depress real estate values and prevent access to preserve
corridors for lTD, making land less expensive to acquire through condemnation.
The City'S ordinance relating to access to state highways should be held void and of no
force or effect. The City's attempt to control access runs contrary to the notion oflimited
government, and particularly offends the concept ofprivate property rights in light of the City's
goal to benefit the State in future condemnation cases. These precepts are at the very core of our
constitutional system of government.
Therefore, Wylie requests this Court reverse the lower Court's summary judgment based
upon waiver and rule that Meridian City Ordinance 051171 is void on the grounds offield
preemption and ultra vires and directing that a judgment be entered in Wylie's favor.
By enacting the Ordinance and executing the development agreement, the City has
ignored the will ofthe Idaho Legislature, usurped the power ofITD, and ITD has aided the City
in this endeavor. Through this concerted effort, Wylie has lost his constitutionally protected
property right of access, and asks this COUlt to correct that wrong.
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..............--------------------DATED this 10th day ofJune, 2010.

By__________________~~~-----
E DON COPPLE, ofthe firm
Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of June, 2010 a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing was served upon the following:
Karl D. Vogt
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129
William Nary
Meridian City Attorney
33 E. Idaho Ave.
Meridian, Idaho 83642
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JAMES R. WYLIE,
Case No. CV OC 0908647

Plaintiff,
5

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

vs.
6
7
8
9

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, and
THE CITY OF MERIDIAN,
Defendants.

10
11

This is an action for declaratory judgment. In his Second Amended Complaint filed May 15,

12

2009, Plaintiff James R. Wylie seeks a declaration from this Court that the Idaho Transportatio

13

Department, hereinafter lTD, has exclusive jurisdiction over State Highway 20/26 and controls acces

14

to that highway from Plaintiffs property which is adjacent to it. Plaintiff also seeks a declaratio
from this Court that the City of Meridian has no jurisdiction or control over access to State Highwa

15

20126 and its City Ordinance 05-1171 is therefore void. On June 8, 2009, Defendant City

0

16

Meridian, hereinafter City, filed Defendant City of Meridian's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Secon

17

Amended Complaint, Affidavit of Tara Green in Support of Defendant City of Meridian's Motion t

18

Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, Affidavit of Jaycee Holman in Support of Defendan

19

City of Meridian's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, and Memorandum i
Support of Defendant City of Meridian's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint.

20

The City sought dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(I) an

21

12(b)(6). On June 22, 2009, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was filed as was the Affidavi

22

of E Don Copple in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of James R. Wylie i

23

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summar
Judgment. On July 17, 2009, Defendant State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board, hereinafter th

24

Transportation Board, filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summar
25

26

Judgment, Affidavit of Steven M. Parry in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Affidavit of Brent Jennings, P.E., Highway Operations an
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Safety Engineer. There followed a series of reply briefs, memoranda, and affidavits from the partie
1

to these motions that the Court will not list here. However, the City did begin referring to its motio
2

as one for summary judgment apparent1y because of the numerous affidavits both in support of an

3

opposition to the City's motion which had not been excluded. See I.R.C.P. l2(b). On July 20, 2009

4

Defendant City of Meridian's Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of James R. Wylie in Support

0

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Defendant City

0

5

Meridian's Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of James R. Wy1ie in Support of Plaintiffs Motio
6

for Summary Judgment were also filed. On July 24, 2009, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition t
7

City of Meridian's Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of James R. Wylie was filed. Hearing

0

8

these motions was held on September 28, 2009. At that time, the Court found the City's motion t

9

strike was moot because the portions of the affidavit involved were not related to any issue currentl

10

before the Court. The Court took the cross-motions for summary judgment under advisement.
The following facts are not in dispute. The case concerns the property known as Knighthil

11

Center Subdivision, located on the southwest corner of Chinden Boulevard and Linder Road i
12

Meridian, Idaho. Chinden Boulevard is also known as State Highway 20/26 and will hereinafter b

13

referred to as SH 20/26. The Plaintiff s predecessor in interest entered into a development agreemen

14

for Knighthill Center Subdivision on July 18,2006 with the developer and the City. This agreement i

15

attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Jaycee Holman in Support of Defendant City of Meridian'
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Summary Judgment i

16

Favor of Defendant City of Meridian filed on July 20, 2009. This agreement set forth the condition
17

of the annexation and zoning of the subdivision. The agreement does not provide for direct traffi

18

access to or from SH 20/26; but rather uses alternative points for ingress and egress. This documen

19

was recorded against the property on July 31, 2006. Plaintiff filed an application to modify th

20

development agreement and for a preliminary plat. The applications were approved by the Meridia
City Council on August 26, 2008. However, at that time the Plaintiff did not request direct access t

21

SH 20/26. On February 24, 2009 the Plaintiff filed an application for a variance from the Unifie
22

Development Code, Meridian City Code § ll-3H-4(b), which limits points of access to stat

23

highways, and requested direct access to SH 20/26. A hearing was held and the Meridian Cit

24

Council denied the variance application on May 5, 2009. The Plaintiff subsequently filed his origina

25

complaint in the district court on May 6, 2009.
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter as the Plaintiff is challenging the validity

0

26

Meridian City Code §11-3H-4(b) and not the denial of the variance itself. See McCuskey v. Canyo
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County, 123 Idaho 657, 660-661, 851 P.2d 953 (1993). City Ordinance 05-1171 has been codified a
1

Meridian City Code §11-3H-l, 2, 3, and 4.
2

The cross-motions for summary judgment relate to the aforementioned City ordinance. Th

3

City contends the ordinance was properly authorized and has the force and effect of law. Plaintif

4

asserts that the City had no authority to create the ordinance which controls access points to stat

5

highways and, therefore, should be found ultra vires.
Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings, affidavits

6

and discovery documents ... , read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate n
7

material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'

8

Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002) (internal citation

9

omitted). Ordinarily, the district court is to "construe facts in the existing record in favor of th

10

nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonrnovin
party." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876 (1991) (internal citations omitted). Eve

11

where the district court will be the trier of fact it "would be required to view conflicting evidentiar
12

facts in favor of the [nonmoving party]." Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 P.2d 1283

13

(Ct.App. 1984). However, "where the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather tha

14

a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment will be appropriate despite the possibility

15

0

conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving those conflictin
inferences." Riverside Development Company v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657 (1982).

16

"If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains.'
17

18
19
20

Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 443,445,65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003).
As mentioned above, the facts are not in dispute in this case. The question therefore become
whether either party "is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). As was noted earlier,
Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment from this Court that Meridian City Code §11-3H-l, et seq., i
void because the City was acting outside the scope of its authority by enacting the ordinance.

21

However, before this Court can address that claim, it must first address the City'S contention tha
22

Plaintiff's claim would resolve neither the uncertainty nor the controversy "giving rise to th

23

proceeding." I.C. 10-1206.

24

25

"As a general rule, a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an actual

0

justiciable controversy exists." Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P .2d 988 (1984
(internal citations omitted). "[T]he United States Supreme Court aptly summarized the pivota

26
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elements of a justiciable controversy in Aetna Life Insurance Co. V. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct.
1

461,81 L.Ed. 617 (1937).
2
3
4

5

A 'controversy' in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial
determination. . .. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or
dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. ....
The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests .... It must be a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

6
7

300 U.S. at 240-41,57 S.Ct. at 464 (citations omitted)." Id. (internal citations omitted).
The aforementioned development agreement binds the developer and owner to the agreement.

8

9

"Owner" is defined as including "any subsequent owner(s) of the 'Property'." Developmen
Agreement AZ 06-006 p. 3 sec. 3.3. As a result, Plaintiff, as the successor in interest to the property,

10

is bound by the agreement. As has been previously noted, the agreement did not include traffic acces

11

to and from SH 20126, using instead alternative points for ingress and egress. By its terms, th

12

agreement incorporates the City of Meridian Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision
Order for the city council hearing of May 9, 2009. See Development Agreement AZ 06-006 p. 2 sec.

13

1. 7. The City of Meridian Findings of F act, Conclusions of Law and Decision & Order includes th

14

City of Meridian Planning Department Staff Report for the Hearing Date of May 9, 2006. See City

15

Meridian Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision & Order p. 3 sec. F. The included staf

16

report provides: "The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State Highwa

17

0

20-26) but is not proposing direct access to that facility." City of Meridian Planning Department Staf
Report for the Hearing Date of May 9, 2006 p. 4 sec. 6.i.

18

"Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law." Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates,

19

L.L.C, 140 Idaho 354,361,93 P.3d 685 (2004) (internal citations omitted). "If a contract's terms ar

20

clear and unambiguous, the contract's meaning and legal effect are questions oflaw, and the meanin

21

of the contract and intent of the parties must be determined from the contract's plain words." Taylo

22

v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 140, 59 P.3d 308 (2002) (internal citation omitted). " 'The purpose

0

interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the contracting parties at the time the contract wa
23

entered .... ' Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182,185-186,75 P.3d 743,746-747 (2003

24

(internal citations omitted)." Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185,190,108 P.3

25

332 (2005).

26

The development agreement, including its attached documents, is not ambiguous. It is clea
from the plain meaning of the terms of this agreement that Plaintiffs predecessor in interest ha
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..............------------------------committed itself to not seeking direct access to SH 20/26; a commitment that is binding on Plaintiff.
1

However, contrary to Plaintiffs argument, this agreement does not constitute an ultra vires attemp
2

by the City to circumvent lTD's authority over access to state highways. First of all, lTD is not

3

signatory to this agreement and, therefore, would not be bound by its terms. Secondly, the agreemen

4

does not limit ITO's authority to grant encroachment permits for access to SH 20/26. See, e.g., lTD'

5

Administrative Policy A-12-01; State Highway Access Control. Rather, it merely restricts Plaintiff
ability to seek such a permit. A similar conclusion was reached when Plaintiffs application for a

6

encroachment permit was denied in a letter from ITO's chief engineer, Tom E. Cole, dated March 24
7

2009. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Brent Jennings, P.E., Highway Operations and Safety Enginee

8

filed on July 17,2009. This Court has been cited to no authority, nor is it aware of any such authority,

9

that an agreement by a landowner to forego applying for an encroachment permit contravenes an

10

law or public policy thereby constituting illegal consideration. cf Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560
566-568, 944 P.2d 695 (1997) (noting specific statutory provisions that were violated by a contrac

11

where one of the parties, e.g., agreed not to report allegations involving sexual abuse of a child).
12

Therefore, the development agreement is enforceable against Plaintiff.

13

In order to address Plaintiff s claim for declaratory judgment, this Court would therefor

14

have to assume Plaintiffs binding agreement with the City did not exist. This would constitut

15

rendering an advisory opinion on a hypothetical set of facts; something which this Court may not do.
See, again, Harris v. Cassia County, supra, 106 Idaho 516. Because no justiciable controversy exist

16

in the case at bar, Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he is requesting.
17

In consideration of the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

18

Defendant City of Meridian's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, havin

19

become one for summary judgment, is granted. The City of Meridian is hereby directed to prepare

20

form of judgment consistent with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

21
22
23
24

Dated this ~ day of

Q

«.

.(.

,2009.

s:=~

TIMOTHY HANSEN
District Judge

25
26
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1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2

I, 1. David Navarro the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I havemailed.by
United States Mail, on this_ ,~ day of ~{i(By\
2009, one copy of the ORDER as
notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) l.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes
addressed as follows:

3
4

5

6
7

8

1

Ga.1\.?

,

E. DON COPPLE
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
WASHINGTON MUTUAL CAPITOL PLAZA, SUITE 600
199 NORTH CAPITOL BOULEVARD
P.O. BOX 1583
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

9

10
11

12
13
14
15

WILLIAM NARY
MERIDIAN CITY ATTORNEY
33 E. IDAHO AVENUE
MERIDIAN, IDAHO 83642
SCOT R. CAMPBELL
STEVEN PARRY
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT
3311 WEST STATE STREET
P.O. BOX 7129
BOISE, IDAHO 83707

16
17
18
19

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

By __\~~~~~________

20
21
22
23

24
25
26
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,CIlY OF MERIDIAN ORDINANCE NO.

_tl_?_-_I_I_7_1

BY THE CITY COUNCIL: BIRD, DONNELL, ROUNTREE, WARDLE
AN ORDINANCE ENACTING A NEW PROVISION OF THE UNIFIED
DEVELOPMENT CODE PERTAINING TO DEVELOPMENT ALONG STATE
IDGHWAYS TO BE CODIFIED AT TITLE 11, CHAPTER 3, ARTICLE H OF
THE MERIDIAN CITY CODE; ADDING A NEW DEFINITION OF THE TERM
"APPROACH" TO TITLE 11, CHAPTER 1, ARTICLE A, SECTION 1 OF THE
MERIDIAN CIlY CODE; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.

,Joe

~

WHEREAS, on the
day of
f2005, the Meridian
City Council approved Ordinance No. &75'- ~
enacting a new Unified
Development Code, codified at Title 11 of the Meridian City Code; and,
WHEREAS, the Meridian City Council desires to adopt an additional provision
of the Unified Development Code pertaining to development along state highways for the
purposes stated herein.
NOW, TilEREOFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL
OF THE CITY OF MERIDIAN, IDAHO:
Section 1.
read as follows:

That a new Title 11, Chapter 3, Article H is hereby enacted and shall

11-3H-l:
PURPOSE: The regulations of this Article are intended to achieve three
purposes: 1) limit access points to state highways in order to maintain traffic flow and
provide better circulation and safety within the community and for the traveling public, 2)
to preserve right-of-way for future highway expansions, and 3) design new residential
development along state highways to mitigate noise impacts associated with such
roadways.
11-3H-2:
APPLICABll..ITY: The following standards shall apply to all
development along state highways, including but not limited to State Highway 69, State
Highway 55, State Highway 20-26, and Interstate 84. The following standards shall also
apply to development along McDermott Road from Chinden Boulevard to Interstate 84 as
the City of Meridian's preferred location for a future highway right-of~way for the State
Highway 16 extension. If the Idaho Transportation Department (lTD) determines an
alternate location for the State Highway 16 extension, these standards shall apply to the
lTD determined location.
11-3H-3:
PROCESS: Staff shall review all development applications for
compliance with these standards. The decision making body may consider and apply
modifications to the standards of this section upon specific recommendation of the Idaho
Transportation Department.
.
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11-3H-4:

STANDARDS:

A.

Access to 1-84 and McDermott Road (or future Highway 16 extension): no access
shall be allowed except at specific interchange locations as established by the
Idaho Transportation Department.

B.

Access to State Highway 69, State Highway 55, and State Highway 20-26:
1. Use of existing approaches shall be allowed to continue provided that all of the
following conditions are met:

a. The existing use is lawful and properly permitted effective :xx [insert date of
the adoption]
b. The nature of the use does not change (for example a residential use to a
commercial use).
c. The intensity of the use does not increase (for example an increase in the
number of residential dwelling units or an increase in the square footage of
commercial space).
2. If an applicant proposes a change or increase in intensity of use, the owner shall
develop or otherwise acquire access to a street other than the state highway. The
use of the existing approach shall cease and the approach shall be abandoned
and removed.

a. No new approaches directly accessing a state highway shall be allowed.
b. Public street connections to the state highway shall only be allowed at:

i.

the section line road; and

ii. the half-mile mark between section line roads. These half-mile connecting
streets shall be collector roads.
3. The applicant shall construct a street, generally paralleling the state highway, to
provide future connectivity and access to all properties fronting the state
highway that lie between the applicant's property and the nearest section line
road and/or half mile collector road. The intent is to provide for future
connectivity and access to all properties fronting the state highway that lie
between the applicant's property and the nearest section line road and/or halfmile collector road. The street shall be designed to collect and distribute traffic.
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a, The applicant shall be responsible to construct the segment ofthe street within
the applicant's property. This standard is not intended to require off-site
improvements.

b. The street shall meet the road standards of the Ada County Highway District.
c. The street shall connect to the section line road at a distance that is no closer
than 660 (as measured from center line to center line) from the intersection
with the state highway.
d. The street shall provide buildable lots between the bighway and the collector
road. For the purposes of this Article, such streets shall be tenned backage
roads.

e. Frontage streets or private streets may be considered by the Council at the

time of property annexation or through the conditional use process. Frontage
streets and private streets shall be limited to areas where there is sufficient
acCess to surrounding properties and a public street is not desirable in that
location.
C.

Design and construction standards for state highways:
1. The applicant shall have an approved pennit from the Idaho Transportation

Department for construction of any access to the state highway andlor any
construction done in the highway right of way.
2. The width of right-of-way reservations shall be as set forth by the ITD
3. Along State Highway 55, the applicant shall be responsible for constructing a

ten-foot (10') multiuse pathway with a public use easement=and installing
streetlights and landscaping consistent with the Eagle Road Corridor Study.
4. Along Highway 69, the applicant shall be responsible for constructing a ten-foot

(10') multi-use pathway with a public use easement.
D.

Noise abatement for residential uses along state highways:
1. The applicant shall provide traffic noise abatement by constructing a berm or a
berm and wall combination approximately parallel to the state highway.
2. The top of the berm or berm and wall in combination shall be a minimum often

feet (10') higher than the elevation at the centerline of the state highway.

3. If a wall is proposed, the wall shall meet the following standards:
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a. Wall materials shall be impervious concrete or stucco or other appropriate
sound attenuating material.
b. Intermittent breaks in the berm or berm and wall in combination will degrade
the function and shall not be allowed.
c. The applicant shall not construct a monotonous wall. In order to achieve this
standard, the applicant may choose one or both of the following variations:

i.

The color andlor texture of the wall shall be varied every 300 linear feet.
This could include murals or artwork.

ii. The wall shall be staggered every 300 linear feet subject to Section II-3R4D4 above that prohibits breaks in the wall.
4. The Director may approve alternative compliance as set forth in Chapter 5
ADMINISTRATION of this Title where the applicant has a substitute noise
abatement proposal in accord with lTD standards and prepared by a qualified
sound engineer.
Section 2. That the following definition shall be added to Title 11, Chapter 1,
Article A, Section 1:
ApprOach: an access from a state highway. The access may be a driveway.
common drive, private street, Qr a commerciaVindustrial drive aisle.
Section 3.

This ordinance shall be in full force and effect on the 15th day of

September, 2005, after its passage, approval and publication.

PASSED by the City Council of the City of Meridian, Idaho, this
~+- ,2005.
APPROVED by the Mayor of the City of Meridian, Idaho, this
~'" ,2005.
APPROVE.~D~:

________

30~day of

J.()~ day of

\

£
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ARTICLE H. DEVELOPMENT ALONG FEDERAL AND
STATE HIGHWAYS
11-3H-1: PURPOSE:
The regulations of this article are intended to achieve three (3) purposes: a) limit access points
to state highways in order to maintain traffic flow and provide better circulation and safety
within the community and for the traveling public, b) to preserve right of way for future highway
expansions, and c) design new residential development along state highways to mitigate noise
impacts associated with such roadways. (Ord. 05-1171, 8-30-2005, eff. 9-15-2005)

11-3H-2: APPLICABILITY:
The following standards shall apply to all development along state highways, including, but not
limited to, State Highway 69, State Highway 55, State Highway 20-26, and Interstate 84. The
following standards shall also apply to development along McDermott Road from Chinden
Boulevard to Interstate 84 as the city of Meridian's preferred location for a future highway right
of way for the State Highway 16 extension. If the Idaho transportation department (ITO)
determines an alternate location forthe State Highway 16 extension, these standards shall
apply to the ITO determined location. (Ord. 05-1171, 8-30-2005, eff. 9-15-2005)

11-3H-3: PROCESS:
Staff shall review all development applications for compliance with these standards. The
decision making body may consider and apply modifications to the standards of this article
upon specific recommendation of the Idaho transportation department. (Ord. 05-1171, 8-302005, eff. 9-15-2005)

11-3H-4: STANDARDS:
A. Access to and/or from 1-84 and McDermott Road (or future Highway 16 extension): No
access shall be allowed except at specific interchange locations as established by the
Idaho transportation department.

B. Access to and/or from State Highway 6.9, State Highway 55, and State Highway 20-26:
(Ord. 07-1325, 7-10-2007)

1. Use of eXisting approaches shall be allowed to continue provided that all of the following
conditions are met:
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a. The existing use is lawful and properly permitted effective September 15, 2005.
b. The nature of the use does not change (for example a residential use to a commercial
use).
c. The intensity of the use does not increase (for example an increase in the number of
residential dwelling units or an increase in the square footage of commercial space).
2. If an applicant proposes a change or increase in intensity of use, the owner shall develop
or otherwise acquire access to a street other than the state highway, The use of the
existing approach shall cease and the approach shall be abaQdoned and removed.
a. No new approaches directly accessing a state highway shall be allowed.
b. Public street connections to the state highway shall only be allowed at:
(1) The section line road; and
(2) The half mile mark between section line roads. These half mile connecting streets
shall be collector roads.
3. The applicant shall construct a street, generally paralleling the state highway, to provide
future connectivity and access to all properties fronting the state highway that lie between
the applicant's property and the nearest section line road and/or half mile collector road.
The intent is to provide for future connectivity and access to all properties fronting the
state highway that lie between the applicant's property and the nearest section line road
and/or half mile collector road. The street shall be designed to collect and distribute
traffic.
a. The applicant shall be responsible to construct the segment of the street within the
applicant's property. This standard is not intended to require off site improvements.
b. The street shall meet the road standards of the Ada County highway district.
c. The street shall connect to the section line road at a distance that is no closer than six
hundred sixty (660) (as measured from centerline to centerline) from the intersection
with the state highway.
d. The street shall provide buildable lots between the highwayand the collector road. For
the purposes of this article, such streets shall be termed "backage roads".
e. Frontage streets or private streets may be considered by the council at the time of
property annexation or through the conditional use process. Frontage streets and
private streets shall be limited to areas where there is sufficient access to surrounding
properties and a public street is not desirable in that location.

C. Design and construction standards for state highways:
1. The applicant shall have an approved permit from the Idaho transportation department
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for construction of any access to the state highway and/or any construction done in the
highway right of way.
2. The width of right of way reservations shall be as set forth by the ITO.
3. Along State Highway 55, the applicant shall be responsible for constructing a ten foot
(10') multiuse pathway with a public use easement and installing streetlights and
landscaping consistent with the Eagle Road corridor study. (Ord. 05-1171,8-30-2005,
eff. 9-15-2005)
4. Along Highway 69 and Highway 20-26, the applicant shall be responsible for
constructing a ten foot (10') multiuse pathway with a public use easement. (Ord. 07-1325,
7-10-2007)

O. Noise abatement for residential uses along state highways:
1. The applicant shall provide traffic noise abatement by constructing a berm or a berm and
wall combination approximately parallel to the state highway.
2. The top of the berm or berm and wall in combination shall be a minimum of ten feet (10')
higher than the elevation at the centerline of the state highway.
3. If a wall is proposed, the wall shall meet the following standards:
a. Wall materials shall be impervious concrete or stucco or other appropriate sound
attenuating material.
b. Intermittent breaks in the berm or berm and wall in combination will degrade the
function and shall not be allowed.
c. The applicant shall not construct a monotonous wall. In order to achieve this standard,
the applicant may choose one or both of the following variations:
(1) The color and/or texture of the wall shall be varied every three hundred (300) linear
feet. This could include murals or artwork.
(2) The wall shall be staggered every three hundred (300) linear feet subject to
subsection 03b of this section that prohibits breaks in the wall.
4. The director may approve alternative compliance as set forth in chapter 5,
"Administration", of this title where the applicant has a substitute noise abatement
proposal in accord with ITO standards and prepared by a qualified sound engineer. (Ord.
05-1171, 8-30-2005, eff. 9-15-2005)
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DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT
PARTIES:

1.
2.

City of Meridian
Foothill Knights, LLC, Owner
Sea 2 Sea, LLC, Developer

3.

TIllS DEVELOPMENT AGREElMENT (this "Agreement"), is made and
entered into this
day of V'""M~
, 2006, by and between City of Meridian, a
municipal corporation of the State ofIda~, hereafter cailed "CITY", Sea 2 Sea, LLC, whose
address is 757 West Bankside Drive, Eagle, Idaho 83616, hereinafter called "DEVELOPER",
and Foothill Knights, LLC, whose address is 757 West Bankside Drive, Eagle, Idaho 83616,
hereinafter called "OWNER".

£-f6

1.

RECITALS:
1.1

WHEREAS, "Owner" are the sole owners, in law and/or equity, of
certain tract ofland in the County of Ada, State ofIdaho, described in
Exhibit A for each owner, which is attached hereto and by this
reference incorporated herein as if set forth in full, herein after referred
to as the "Property"; and
.

1.2

WHEREAS, I.C. § 67-6511A, Idaho Code, provides that cities may, by
ordinance, require or pennit as a condition of re-zoning that the
"Developer" and/or "Owner" make a written commitment concerning
the use or development of the subject "Property"; and

1.3

WHEREAS, "City" has exercised its statutory authority by the
enactment of the Meridian Unified Development Code, which
authorizes development agreements upon the annexation and/or re~
zoning of land; and

1.4

WHEREAS, "Developer" has submitted an application for annexation
and zoning of the "Property's" described in Exhibit A, and has
requested a designation of (C-G) General Commercial District,
(Municipal Code of the City of Meridian); and

1.5

WHEREAS, "Developer" and/or "Owner') made representations at the
public hearings both before the Meridian Planning & ZQning
Commission and before the Meridian City Council, as to how the
subject "Property" will be developed and what improvements will be
made; and

J. '
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1.6

WHEREAS, record of the proceedings for the requested annexation
and zoning designation of the subject "PropertY' held before the
Planning & Zoning Commission, and subsequently before the City
Council, include responses of government subdivisions providing
services within the City of Meridian planning jurisdiction, and received
further testimony and comment; and

1. 7

WHEREAS, City Council. the 9th day of May, 2006, has approved
certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decision and
Order, set forth in Exhibit B, which are attached hereto and by this
reference incorporated herein as if set forth in full, hereinafter referred
to as (the "Findings"); and
.

1.8

WHEREAS, the Findings require the "Developer" andlor "Owner" to
enter into a development agreement before the City Council takes final
action on annexation and zoning designation; and

1.9

"DEVELOPER" and/or "OWNER" deem it to be in their best
interest to be able to enter into this Agreement and acknowledges that
this Agreement was entered into voluntarily and at their urging and
requests; and

1.10

WHEREAS, "City" requires the "Developer" andlor "Owner" to enter
into a development agreement for the purpose of ensuring that the
"Property" is developed and the subsequent use of the "Property" is in
accordance with the terms and conditions of this development
agreement, herein being established as a result of evidence received by
the ~'City" in the proceedings for zoning designation from government
subdivisions providing services within the planning jurisdiction and
from affected property owners and to ensure re-zoning designation is in
accordance with the amended Comprehensive Plan of the City of .
Meridian adopted August 6, 2002, Resolution No. 02-382, and the
Zoning and Development Ordinances codified in Meridian City Code
Title 11 and Title 12.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants and conditions set
forth herein, the parties agree as follows:

2.

INCORPORATION OF REClTALS: That the above recitals are contractual

and binding and are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.
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3.
DEFINITIONS: For all purposes of this Agreement the following words,
terms, and phrases herein contained in this section shall be defined and interpreted as herein
provided for, unless the clear context ofthe presentation of the same requires otherwise:

3.1

"CITY": means and refers to the City of Meridian, a party to this
Agreement, which is a municipal Corporation and government
subdivision of the state of Idaho, organized and existing by virtue of
law of the State of Idaho, whose address is 33 East Idaho Avenue,
Meridian, Idaho 83642.

3.2

"DEVELOPER": means and refers to Sea 2 Sea, LLC, whose address
is 757 West Bankside Drive, Eagle, Idaho 83616, the party developing
said "Property" and shall include any subsequent developer(s) of the
"Property".

3.3

"OWNER":· means and refers to Foothill Knights, LLC, whose
address is 757 West Bankside Drive, Eagle, Idaho 83616, the party that
owns said "Property" and shall include any subsequent owner(s) of the
"Property" .

3.4

4.

"PROPERTY":

means and refers to that certain parcel(s) of
"Property" located in the County ofAda, City of Meridian as described
in Exhibit A describing the parcels to be annexed and zoned c-o
(General Commercial District) attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein as if set forth at length.

USES PERMITTED BY THIS AGREEMENT:
4.1

The uses allowed pursuant to this Agreement are only those uses
allowed under "City's" Zoning Ordinance codified at Meridian City
Code Section 11 which are herein specified as follows:

Construction and development ofa Certificate o/Zoning Compliance
shall he submitted to the City of Meridian prior to a future
development in the C=G zone, and the pertinentprovisions ofthe City
of Meridian Comprehensive Plan are applicable to this AZ 06~006
application.
4.2

No change in the uses specified in this Agreement shall be allowed
without modification of this Agreement.
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5.
CONDITIONS
PROPERTY:

5.1.

GOVERNING

DEVELOPMENT

OF

SUBJECT

"Developer" andlor "Owner" shall develop the "Property" in accordance with
the following special conditions:

5.1.1

That all future uses shall not involve uses, activities, processes,
materials, equipment and conditions of operation that will be
detrimental to any persons, property or the general welfare by reason of
excessive production of traffic, noise, smoke, fumes, glare or odors.

5.1.2 That all future development of the sUbject property shall be cons1ructed
in accordance with City of Meridian ordinances in effect at the time of
the development.
. 5.1.3

That the applicant be responsible for all costs associated with the sewer
and water service extension.

5.1.4 That any existing domestic wells andlor septic systems within this
project will have to be removed from their domestic service, per City
Ordinance Section 5-7-517, when services are available from the City
of Meridian. Wells may be used for non-domestic purposes such as
landscape irrigation.

5.1.5 That prior to issuance of nay building permit, the subject property shall
be subdivided in accordance with the City of Meridian Unified
Development Code.
5.1.6 That a 25-foot wide commercial drive aisle, sewer, and water shall be
stubbed to the property located at 6175 N. Linder Road.

5.1.7 That development of the property shall comply substantially with the
conceptual site plan shown on the preliminary plat dated January 5,
2006.
5.1.8 That the applicant shall provide signage which indicates that there is an
exit towards W. Everest Lane.
5.1.9 That the applicant shall provide evidence of a recorded cross access
easement with the development to the west for access to W. Everest
Lane, which is a private street.
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6.
COMPLIANCE PERIOD/CONSENT TO REZONE: This Agreement and
the commitments contained herein shall be terminated, and the zoning designation reversed,
upon a default of the "Developer" andlor "Owner" or "Developers" andlor "Owners" heirs,
successors, assigns, to comply with Section 6 entitled "Conditions Governing Development of
Subject Property" of this agreement within two years of the date this Agreement is effective,
and after the "City" has complied with the notice and hearing procedures as outlined in Idaho
Code § 67-6509, or any subsequent amendments or recodifications thereof.

7.
CONSENT TO DE-ANNEXATION AND REVERSAL OF
ZONING DESIGNATION:
''Developer'' andlor 140wner" consents upon default to the reversal of the
zoning designation ofthe "Property" subject to and conditioned upon the following conditions
precedent to-wit:
7.1
i

That the "City" provide written notice of any failure to comply with this
Agreement to "Developer" andlor "Owner and if the "Developer"
andlor "Owner" fails to cure such failure within six (6) months of such
notice.

8.
INSPECTION: "Developer" andlor "Owner" shall, immediately upon
completion of any portion or the entirety of said development of the "Property" as required
by this agreement or by City ordinance or policy, notifY the City Engineer and request the
City Engineer's inspections and written approval of such completed improvements or portion
thereof in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Development Agreement and all .
other ordinances of the "City" that apply to said Development.

9.

DEFAULT:

9.1

In the event "Developer" andlor "Owner", or "Developer's" and/or
"Owner's" heirs, successors, assigns, or subsequent owners of the
"Property" or any other person acquiring an interest in the "Property",
fail to faithfully comply with all of the terms and conditions included
in this Agreement in connection with the "Property", this Agreement
may be modified or terminated by the "City" upon compliance with
the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance.

9.2

A waiver by "City" of any default by ''Developer'' andlor "Owner" of

anyone or more of the covenants or conditions hereof shall apply
solely to the breach and breaches waived and shaH not bar any other
rights or remedies of "City" or apply to any subsequent breach of any
such or other covenants and conditions.
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10.
REQUIREMENT FOR RECORDATION: "City" shall record either a
memorandum of this Agreement or this Agreement, including all of the Exhibits, at
"Developer's" and/or "Owner's" cost, and submit proof of such recording to "Developer"
and/or "Owner", prior to the third reading of the Meridian Zoning Ordinance in connection
with the re-zoning of the "Property" by the City Council. If for any reason after such
recordation, the City Council fails to adopt the ordinance in connection with the annexation
and zoning of the "Property" contemplated hereby, the "City" shall execute and record an
appropriate instrument of release of this Agreement.
11.
ZONING: "City" shall, following recordation of the duly approved
Agreement, enact a valid and binding ordinance zoning the "Property" as specified herein.
12.
REMEDIES: This Agreement shall be enforceable in any court of competent
jurisdiction by either "City" or "Developer" andlor "Owner", or by any successor or
successors in title or by the assigns of the parties hereto. Enforcement may be sought by an
appropriate action at law or in equity to secure the specific performance of the covenants,
agreements, conditions, and obligations contained herein.

12.1

In the event of a material breach of this Agreement, the parties agree
that "City" and "Developer" andlor "Owner" shall have thirty (30)
days after delivery of notice of said breach to correct the same prior to
the non-breaching party's seeking of any remedy provided for herein;
provided, however, that in the case of any such default which cannot
with diligence be cured within such thirty (30) day period, if the
defaulting party shall commence to cure the same within such thirty
(30) day period and thereafter shall prosecute the curing of same with
diligence and continuity, then the time allowed to cure such failure
may be extended for such period as may be necessary to complete the
curing of the same with diligence and continuity.
.

In the event the performance of any covenant to be perfonned
hereunder by either "Developer" and/or "Owner" or "City" is delayed
for causes which are beyond the reasonable control of the party
responsible for such performance, which shall include, without
limitation, acts of clvil disobedience, strikes or similar causes, the
time for such performance shall be extended by the amount oftime of
such delay.
13.
SURETY OF PERFORMANCE: The "City" may also require surety
bonds, irrevocable letters of credit, cash deposits, certified check ot.' negotiable bonds, as

12.2
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allowed under Meridian City Code §12-5 3, to insure that installation ofthe improvements,
which the "Developer" andlor "Owner" agree to provide, if required by the "City".
B

14.
CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY: The "Developer" andlor "Owner"
agree that no Certificates of Occupancy will be issued until aU improvements are completed,
unless the "City" and "Developer" andlor "Owner" has entered into an addendum agreement
stating when the improvements will be completed in a phased developed; and in any event,
no Certificates of Occupancy shall be issued in any phase in which the improvements have
not been installed, completed, and accepted by the "City".
15.
ABIDE BY ALL CITY ORDINANCES: That "Developer" and/or
"Owner" agree to abide by all ordinances of the City of Meridian and the "Property" shall be
subject to de-annexation if the owner or his assigns, heirs, or successors shall not meet the
conditions contained in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Development
Agreement, and the Ordinances of the City of Meridian.
16
NOTICES: Any notice desired by the parties and/or required by this
Agreement shall be deemed delivered if and when personally delivered or three (3) days after
deposit in the United States Mail, registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, return receipt
requested, addressed as follows:
CITY:

DEVELOPER:

c/o City Engineer
City of Meridian
33 E. Idaho Ave.
Meridian, ID 83642

Sea 2 Sea, LLC
757 W. Bankside Drive
Eagle, ID 83616

OWNER:
Foothill Knights, LLC
757 W. Bankside Drive
Eagle, ID 83616
with copy to:

City Clerk
City of Meridian
33 E. Idaho Avenue
Meridian, ID 83642
DEVELOPMffi'IT AGREEMENT (AZ 06 006) KNIGHTHILL CENTER SUBDIVISION
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16.1

A party shall have the right to change its address by delivering to the
other party a written notification thereof in accordance with the
requirements of this section.

17.
ATTORNEY FEES: Should any litigation be commenced between the
parties hereto concerning this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled, in addition to
any other relief as may be granted, to court costs and reasonable attorney's fees as
determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction. This provision shall be deemed to be a
separate contract between the parties and shall survive any default, tennination or forfeiture
of this Agreement.

18.
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE: The parties hereto acknowledge and agree
that time is strictly of the essence with respect to each and every term, condition and
provision hereof, and that the failure to timely perform any ofthe obligations hereunder shall
constitute a breach of and a default under this Agreement by the other party so failing to
perform.
'19.
BINDING UPON SUCCESSORS: This Agreement shall be binding upon
and inure to the benefit of the parties' respective heirs, successors, assigns and personal
representatives, including "City's" corporate authorities and their successors in office. This
Agreement shall be binding on the "Developer" andlor "Owner" of the "Property", each
subsequent owner and any other person acquiring an interest in the "Property". Nothing
herein shall in any way prevent sale or alienation of the "Property", or portions thereof,
except that any sale or alienation shall be subject to the provisions hereof and any successor
owner or owners shall be both benefited and bound by the conditions and restrictions herein
expressed. "City" agrees, upon written request of "Developer" and/or "Owner", to execute
appropriate and recordable evidence of termination of this Agreement if "City", in its sole
and reasonable discretion, had determined that "Developer" andlor "Owner" has fully
performed its obligations under this Agreement.
20.
INVALID PROVISION: If any provision oftbis Agreement is held not
valid by a court of competent jurisdiction, such provision shall be deemed to be excised from
this Agreement and the invalidity thereof shall not affect any of the other provisions
contained herein.
21.
FINAL AGREEMENT: This Agreement sets forth all promises,
inducements, agreements, condition and understandings bet\¥een "Developer" andlor

"Owner" and "City" relative to the subject matter hereof, and there are no promises,
ag-reements, conditions or understanding, either oral or vVl'itten, express or implied, between
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (AZ 06 006) KNIGHTHILL CENTER SUBDIVISION
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"Developer" and/or "Owner" and "City", other than as are stated herein. Except as herein
otherwise provided, no subsequent alteration, amendment, change or addition to this
Agreement shall be binding upon the parties hereto unless reduced to writing and signed by
them or their successors in interest or their assigns, and pursuant, with respect to "City", to a
duly adopted ordinance or resolution of "City".
.
21.1

No condition governing the uses and/or conditions governing remzoning of the
subject "Property" herein provided for can be modified or amended without
the approval of the City Council after the "City" has conducted public
hearing(s) in accordance with the notice provisions provided for a zoning
designation and/or amendment in force at the time of the proposed
amendment.

22.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT: This Agreement shall be effective
on the date the Meridian City Council shall adopt the amendment to the Meridian Zoning
Ordinance in connection with the annexation and zoning of the "Property" and execution of
the Mayor and City Clerk.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have herein executed this agreement
and made it effective as hereinabove provided.

7lA,LLC
DEVELOPER

By:

&.~
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CITY OF MERIDIAN

,£

BY:

~
7~~~

MAYOiTde WEERD
Attest:

STATE OF IDAHO, )
County of Ada,

: ss
)

ft

Xu {

On this
day of
V , 2006, before me, the undersigned, a
Publi
in
and
for
/said
State,
personally
appeared
---...!~~~~-z:.'Lj~!.f-.J~IY--I------' known or identified to me to be the
-..s....rcIloo£f:J".,...jI-Xo.P4----_ _ _ of Sea 2 Sea, LLC, acknowledged to. me that he
e on behalf of said corporation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official seal the day and year in this certificate first above written.

,
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STATE OF IDAHO, )
: ss
County of Ada,
)

~

~

day of

j U1V

~~~~I;~~~i~~P~U~b~l~'c~~~.andknown
for

,

2006, before me, the

-raid
State, personally
or identified
to me to appeared
be the
Foothill Knights, LLC, acknowledged to me that he
executed the same on be alf of said corporation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official seal the day and year in this certificate first above written.

~~

(SEAL)

No~ Public ~19a1> '(j~J"!;b.

EXpires~ICIf

ResIdmg at: ~
My Commission

County of Ada

: ss
)

On this l~ik
day of
2006, before me, a Notary
Public, personally appeared Tammy de Weerd and illiam G. Berg, Jr., know or identified
to me to b.e tfie.M~yor and Clerk, respectively, of the City of Meridian, who executed the
instrument OF-' the 'Person that executed the instrument of behalf of said City, and
acknowledged to me that such City executed the same.
"

'

iN WITNESS

WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official sel$1.tl»ila.¥ and year in this certificate first above written .
••~ ~l.tA JI,j ••

l~ ~~~o~<.9i·.

l/

<1i~\

(SmAJ!-)
iZ :
~ \~""
/ :
~~:QLlr / / fJ~fII
@",2p"~.'Y..- 9,$\1I\)t>

~

.
=:JO-.AOLnl~~

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: lb..ld\.&CU \D
Commission expires: ..,!1.x,O_-L,!I'I_-.:..J11_ __
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TOOTHMAN. ORTON ENGINEERING COMPANY
CONSULTtNO BNOINSER.S, SURVEYORS AND PLANNERS
9777 CHIN DEN BOULEVARD
601SE, IDAHO 83714-2008
208·323·2236 • fAX 206-323.2399
boise@wellgrco.eom

Project: 05143
Date: December 21, 2005
Page: 1 of 1

EXHIBIT "A"
Land Description for CG Rezone
A par~el ofland located in the NE ~ of the NE ~ of Section -26, Township 4 North,
Range 1 'Jl~ Boi~e Meridian, Ada County, Ide.."ito, described as follows:

Begi.nn~g at a found aluminum cap, marking the corner common to Sections 23, 24,
25 and 20, from Which a found brass cap, marking the quartet comer common to said
Sections 25 and 26, bears g,00054'56ltW., 2657.54 feet; thence, along the section line
common to said Sections 25 and 26 (centerline ofN. Linder Road),
1) S.Oo,~54'56"W
,663.91 feet; thence, leaving said section line,
........ .•''*'.,
I

2) N~&9°Q4'~.9'.'Wi,.72~.oi feet; thence,

.

3). N .00°21 'l:PW.• 656·.84 feet to the centerline of W. Chinden Boulevard; thence,

along said centerline theJollowing Courses:
4) S.89°3S'47"E., 650.61 feetto the beginning of a tangent curve; thence,
5) Southeasterly along said curve to the right, having a radi).lS of 34,377.48 feet, an
arc length of 80.89 feet, through. a central angle of 00 0 08'05", and a chord bearing
and distance of S.89°34'44"E., 80.89 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING.
CONTAlNll'iG: 11.04 acres, more or less.
SUBJECT TO: All Covenants, Rights, Rights-of-Way, .Easements of Reco~d and any

Bncunibrances.
..
.
,.

. ..

~

H:\D5143\WJ>iilesIDESCRIPTIONS\OSI 43-ExhA-CO Rezone,(joe

.

,
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CITY OF MERIDIAN
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND
DECISION & ORDER
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In the Matter of Annexation and Zoning (AZ) from RUT to C-G and Preliminary Plat (PP)
approval of 4 commercial building lots and 1 common/other lot on 10.01 acres for
Knighthill Center Subdivision, by Sea 2 Sea, LLC.
Case No(s): AZ-06-006 and PP-06-00S
For the City Council Hearing Date of: May 9, 2006

RECEIVED
MAY f 8 2006
City, of Meridian

A. Findings of Fact

City Clerk Office

l, Hearing Facts (see attached Staff'Report for the hearing date of May 9, 2006 incorporated
by reference)
2, Process Facts (see attached Staff Report for the hearing date of May 9, 2006 incorporated

by reference)

3. Application and Property Facts (see attached Staff Report for the hearing date of May 9,
2006 incorporated by reference)
4. Required Findings per the Unified Development Code (see attached Staff Report for the
hearing date of May 9, 2006 incorporated by reference)

B. Conclusions of Law
1. The City of Meridian shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by the "Local Land Use
Planning Act of 1975," codified at Chapter 65, Title 67, Idaho Code (I.C, §67-6503).
2. The Meridian City Council takes judicial notice of its Unified Development Code
codified at Title 11 Meridian City Code, and all current zoning maps thereof. The City of
Meridian has, by ordinance, established the Impact Area and the Amended
Comprehensive Plan of the City of Meridian, which was adopted August 6, 2002,
Resolution No. 02-382 and Maps.
3. The conditions shall be reviewable by the City Council pursuant to Meridian City Code §
II-SA.
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4. Due consideration has been given to the comment(s) received from the governmental
subdivisions providing services in the City of Meridian planning jurisdiction.
5. It is found public facilities and services required by the proposed development will not
impose expense upon the public if the attached conditions of approval are imposed.
6. That the City has granted an order of approval in accordance with this Decision, which
shall be signed by the Mayor and City Clerk and then a copy served by the Clerk upon
the applicant, the Planning Department, the Public Works Department and any affected
party requesting notice.
7. That this approval is subject to the Legal Description, Preliminary Plat, and the
Conditions of Approval all in the attached Staff Report for the hearing date of May 9,
2006 incorporated by reference. The conditions are concluded to be reasonable and the
applicant shall meet such requirements as a condition of approval of the application.
C. Decision and Order
Pursuant to the City Council's authority as provided in Meridian City Code § ll-SA and
based upon the above and foregoing Findings of Fact which are herein adopted, it is hereby
ordered that:

1. The applicant's Preliminary Plat as evidenced by having submitted the Preliminary Plat
dated January 5,2006 is hereby conditionally approved;
2. The site specific and standard conditions of approval are as shown in the attached Staff
Report for the hearing date of May 9, 2006 incorporated by reference.
D. Notice of Applicable Time Limits (as applicable)
1. Notice of Preliminary Plat Duration
Please take notice that approval of a preliminary plat, combined preliminary and final
plat, or short plat shall become null and void if the applicant fails to record a fmal plat
within two (2) years of the approval ofthe preliminary plat or one (1) year of the
combined preliminary and final plat or short plat. In the event that the development of
the preliminary plat is made in successive phases in an orderly and reasonable manner,
and conforms substantially to the approved preliminary plat, such segments, if
submitted within successive intervals of eighteen (18) months, may be considered for
final approval without resubmission for preliminary plat approval. Upon written request
and filed by the applicant prior to the termination of the period in accord with Il-6B7.A, the Director may authorize a single extension of time to record the final plat not to
exceed eighteen (18) months. Additional time extensions up to eighteen (18) months as
determined and approved by the City Council may be granted. With all extensjons, the
Director or City Council may require the preliminary plat, combined preliminary and
final plat or short plat to comply with the current provisions of Meridian City Code
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Title 11. If the above timetable is not met and the applicant does not receive a time
extension, the property shall be required to go through the platting procedure again.
E.

Notice of Final Action and Right to Regulatory Takings Analysis
1. The Applicant is hereby notified that pursuant to Idaho Code 67·8003, a denial of a plat
or conditional use pennit entitles the Owner to request a regulatory taking analysis.
Such request must be in writing, and must be filed with the City Clerk not more than
twenty-eight (28) days after the final decision concerning the matter at issue. A request
for a regulatory takings analysis will toll the time period within which a Petition for
Judicial Review may be filed.
2. Please take notice that this is a final action of the goveming body of the City of
Meridian, pursuant to Idaho Code § 67"6521 an affected person being a person who has
an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of
the conditional use pennit approval may within twenty-eight (28) days after the date of
this decision and order seek a judicial review as provided by Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho
Code.

F.

Attached: Staff Report for the hearing date of May 9,2006

.J. •"
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By action of the City Council at its regular meeting held on the
_ _ _ _ _ _ , 2006.

2.3 r;!::

day of

~

COUNCIL MEMBER SHAUN WARDLE

VOTED

COUNCIL MEMBER JOE BORTON

VOTED~

COUNCIL MEMBER CHARLlli ROUNTREE

VOTED

COUNCIL MEMBER KEITH BIRD

VOTED~

MAYOR TAMMY de WEERD
(TIE BREAKER)

VOTED - -

1J1J~

Attest:

ddL-=~

~
. .,

William G. Berg, Jr., itY Clerk'\

"'....

j
S'

r 1st. '#..j.>

~--.,J

)"fll~""""l"
fll,,"1,U

~

..n.'t'
9" .......'
. _\""

""n'"

Copy served upon Applicant, The Planning uepartment, Public Works Department and City
Attorney.

By:jll.Vtf1~ LW

Dated:

5~ 3Q-du>

. y Clerk

f
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CITY OF MERIDIAN PLANNING DEPARTMENT STAFF REPORT FOR THE HEARING DATE OF MAY 9,2006

STAFF REPORT

City Council Hearing
Hearing Date: 5/9/2006

TO:

Mayor and City Council

FROM:

Josh Wilson, Associate City Planner

SUBJECT:

Knighthill Center Subdivision

J
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• AZ-06-006
Annexation and Zoning of 10m acres from RUT to CoG zone
• PP-06-00S
Preliminary Plat of 4 commercial building lots and 1 common lot on 10,01
acres in a proposed CoG zone
1. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF APPLICANT'S REQUEST

The applicant, Sea 2 Sea, LLC, has applied for Annexation and Zoning (AZ) of 10.01 acres from RUT
(Ada County) to CoG (General Retail and Service Commercial) and Preliminary Plat approval of 4
commercial building lots and 1 common lot on 10.01 acres, The applicant has submitted a conceptual site
plan which shows retail, restaurant and financial institution uses on the property. The site is located on
the southwest comer ofN, Linder Road and Chinden Road (SH 20/26).
2. SUMMARY RECOMMENDATION: The Meridian Planning and Zoning Commission heard the
item on March 2 and April 6, 2006. At the public hearing they moved to recommend approval.
a. Summary of Public Hearing:
I.
In favor: Shawn Nickel
II. In opposition: None,
iii. Commenting: None.
IV. Staff presenting application: Josh Wilson.
v. Other staff commenting on application: None.
h. Key Issues of Discussion by Commission:
i. Appearance of the rear of the proposed buHdings from W. Everest Lane
ii. Access to W. Everest Lane, which is a private street
c. Key Commission Changes to Staff Recommendation:
1. Add a Condition which states: "The applicant shall modify the plat to include a
cross access/parking easement for all lots within the subdivision:'
11. Add a restriction to the Development Agreement which states: "The applicant
shall provide sign age which indicates that there is an exit towards W. Everest
Lane."
iii, Add a restriction to the Development Agreement which states: "The applicant
shall provide evidence of a recorded cross access easement with the development
to the west for access to W. Everest Lane, which is a private street."
d. Outstanding Issue(s) for City Council:
1. None,
3. PROPOSED MOTIONS

Approval
After considering all staff, applicant and public testimony, I move to approve File Numbers AZ-
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06·006 and PP-06-005 as presented in the staff report for the hearing date of May 9, 2006, with
the following modifications to the proposed development agreement: (add any proposed
modifications.)
Denial
After considering all staff, applicant and public testimony, I move to deny File Numbers AZ-06006 and PP-06-005 as presented in the staff report for the hearing date of May 9, 2006, for the
following reasons: (you should state specific reasons for denial of the annexation request.)

Continuance

,

After considering all staff, applicant and public testimony, I move to continue File Numbers
AZ-06-006 and PP-06-005 to the hearing date of (insert continued hearing date here) for the
following reason(s): (you should state specifiC reason(s) for continuance.)
4. APPLICATION AND PROPERTY FACTS

a. Site Address/Location:
Southwest corner ofN. Linder Road and Chinden Road (SH 20/26)
NE 1;4, NE \4, Section 26, T4N Rl W
b. Owners:

Foothill Knights, LLC
757 W. Bankside Drive
Eagle, Idaho 83616
c. Applicant:

Sea 2 Sea, LLC
757 W. Bankside Drive
Eagle, Idaho 83616
d. Representative: Shawn Nickel, SLN Planning, Inc.
e. Present Zoning: RUT

ri• •"

f. Present Comprehensive Plan Designation: Low Density Residential

g. Description of Applicant's Request:
1. Date of Preliminary Plat (attached as Exhibit A 1): January 5, 2006

2. Date of Landscape Plan (attached as Exhibit A2): January 4,2006
5. PROCESS FACTS

a. The subject application will in fact constitute an annexation as determined by City Ordinance.
By reason of the provisions ofUDC 11-5B-3, a public hearing is required before the City
Council on this matter.
b. The subject application will in fact constitute a preliminary plat as determined by City
Ordinance. By reason ofthe provisions ofUDe 11-6B-2, a public hearing is required before
the City Council on this matter.
c. Newspaper notifications published on: April 17 and May I, 2006
d. Radius notices mailed to properties within 300 feet on: April 14, 2006

Knighthill Center Subdivision AZ-06-006, PP-06-005
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e. Applicant posted notice on site by: May I, 2006
6. LAND USE
a. Existing Land Use(s): Vacant land
b. Description of Character of Surrounding Area: The property sits on the southwest corner of
Linder Road and Chinden Road, which are both major roadways in the area and can)' large
amounts of vehicular traffic. To the south and west is Lochsa Falls Subdivision, which
contains over 800 single family homes and vacant commercial lots along Chinden Road.
c. Adjacent Land Use and Zoning
1. North: Chinden Road and vacant land, zoned RUT (Ada County).

2. East: Vacant land, zoned RUT (Ada County).
3. South: Lochsa Falls Subdivision, zoned R-4.

4. West: Locbsa Falls Subdivision, zoned RA.
d. History of Previous Actions: None.
e. Existing Constraints and Opportunities
1. Public Works

Location of sewer: There is currently sewer in W. Everest Lane and N. Gertie
Place.
Location of water: There are water stubs in W. Everest Land and N. Gertie
Place.
Issues or concerns: Water main sizing.
2. Vegetation: None.
3. Flood plain: NA

4. Canals/Ditches Irrigation: No major facilities.
5. Hazards: None known.
6. Proposed Zoning: C-G
7. Size of Property: 10.01 acres

f. Subdivision Plat Information
1. Residential Lots: 0
2. Non-residential Lots: 4
3. Total Building Lots: 4

4. Common Lots: I
5. Other Lots: N/A

6. Total Lots: 5
7. Open Lots:

g. Landscaping
1. Width of street buffer(s): 35 feet on Linder Road and Chinden Road.

Knighthill Center Subdivision AZ-06·006, PP"06-005
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2. Width ofbuffer(s) between land uses: 25 feet
3. Percentage of site as open space: 1.01 acres/lO%
4. Other landscaping standards:
h. Proposed and Required Non-Residential Setbacks: per the C~G zone
CoG Standard
Front

ofeet

Side

ofeet

Rear

ofeet

Max. Building Height

65 feet

Min. Lot Size

None

Min. Street Frontage

None

i. Summary of Proposed Streets and/or Access (private, public, common drive, etc.): The access
to the development will be from N. Linder Road to the east and from W. Everest Lane to the
west. A private commercial drive aisle will provide traffic circulation through the site. A
connection will also be made to the stub (N Gertie Place) provided from the south by Lochsa
Falls Subdivision. The subject property does have frontage along Chinden Boulevard (State
Highway 20-26) but is not proposing direct access to that facility.
7. COMMENTS MEETING
On Febtuary 10, 2005 Planning Staff held an agency comments meeting. The agencies and departments
present included: Meridian Fire Department, Meridian Police Department, Meridian Parks Department,
Meridian Public Works Department, and the Sanitary Services Company. Staff has included all comments
and recommended actions as Conditions of Approval in the attached Exhibit B.
8. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN POLICIES AND GOALS
This property is designated "Medium Density Residential" on the Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use
Map. Medium density residential areas are anticipated to contain between three and eight dwellings per
acre (see Page 95 of the Comprehensive Plan.) NOTE: The designation of the subject site on the
Comprehensive Pian Future Land Use Map is proposed to be amended to "Mixed Use Community" with
the current North Meridian Area Comprehensive Plan Amendment (NMA CPA). The NMA CPA is
scheduled to be on the March 7, 2006 City Council agenda. If approved by the City Council, as
recommended by the Commission, this application would comply with the new map designation.

.t. _

Staff finds the following Comprehensive Plan policies to be applicable to this property and apply to the
proposed development (staff analysis in italics below policy):
•

Chapter VII, Goal III, Objective A, Action I
for the provision of all public services.

0

Require that development projects have planned

When the City established its Area of City impact, it planned to provide City services to the subject
property. The City of Meridian plans to provide municipal services to the lands proposed to be
annexed in the following manner:
\) Sanitary sewer and water service will be extended to the project at the developer's expense.
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•

The subject lands currently lie within the jurisdiction of the Meridian Rural Fire District.
Once annexed the lands will be under the jurisdiction of the Meridian City Fire Department,
who currently shares resource and personnel with the Meridian Rural Fire Department.
• The subject lands currently lie within the jurisdiction of the Ada County .Sheriff's Office.
Once annexed the lands will be serviced by the Meridian Police Department (MPD).
• The roadways adjacent to the subject lands are currently owned and maintained by the Ada
County Highway District (ACHD). This service will not change.
• The subject lands are currently serviced by the Meridian School District #2. This service will
not change.
• The su~iect lands are currently serviced by the Meridian Library District. This service will
not change and the Meridian Library District should suffer no revenue loss as a result of the
subject annexation.
Municipal, fee-supported, services will be provided by the Meridian BUilding Department, the
Meridian Public Works Department, the Meridian Water Department, the Meridian Wastewater
Department, the Meridiem Planning Department, Meridian Utility Billing Services, and Sanitary
Services Company.
•

Chapter VI, Goal II, Objective A, Action 6 - Require street connections between subdivisions at
regular intervals to enhance connectivity and better traffic flow.

The submitted preliminary plat proposes to connect to the public stub street from Lochsa Falls
Subdivision to the south and the private stub street from Lochsa Falls SubdiVision to the west.
•

Chapter VII, Goal IV, Objective D, Action 2 ~ Restrict curb cuts and access points on collectors
and arterial streets.

The applicant has proposed one curb cut on N Linder Road, which was approved by ACnD and is
supported by staff.'
•

"Plan for a vat;ety of commercial and retail opportunities within the Impact Area." (Chapter VII,
Goal 1, Objective B)

The proposed use does contribute to the variety of commercial uses in this area, as envisioned with
the Comprehensive Plan Amendment. ,
•

"Restrict curb cuts and access points on collectors and arterial streets." (Chapter VII, Goal IV,
Objective D, Action item 2)

The Idaho Transportation Department (lTD) has previously submitted letters to the City stating that
their policy for access to a Type IV Principal Arterial will be at intersections only, and spaced at oneha/fmile intervals in urban areas. lTD allows approaches (other than intersections) in special cases
and on a temporary basis. Stafffinds that the proposal of no access point to Chinden Boulevard (SH
20-26) meets the location requirements oflTD. Further, stafffinds that Ten Mile Road will serve as
the access point to Chinden Boulevardfor all the properties in this section. lTD has conditioned the
subdivision/or additional rights ofway along Chin den Boulevard, a redesign o/the proposal dated
July 05, 2005 has been submitted which shows the right-of-way line at 90 feet to center linefor
approximately the first 500 feet east ofthe centerline ofTen Mae Road.

Knigllthill Center Subdivision AZ-06-006, PP-06·00S

PAGES

,

I

CITY OF MERIDIAN PLANNING DEPARTMENT STAFF REPORT FOR THE HEARlNG DATE OF MAY 9, 2006

The applicant is requesting to retain Lot 30, Block 1 ofthe design dated January 19,2006. This lot
should be noted on the plat that it is for future right ofway reservation for when lTD roadway
improvements occur. The width of right ofway reservations shall be as set forth by the lTD, UDC
JJ-3H-3C.2

Staff believes that the proposed zoning for this property is appropriate. Staff recommends that the
Commission and Council rely on any verbal or written testimony that may be provided at the public
hearing when determining if the applicant's zoning and development request is appropriate for this
property.
9. ZONING ORDINANCE
a. Zoning Schedule of Use Control: UDC 11-2B-2 lists retail, restaurants, and fmancial
institutions as a Permitted Uses in the C-G zone.
b. Purpose Statement of Zone: The purpose of the Commercial Districts is to provide for the
retail and service needs of the community in accord with the Meridian Comprehensive Plan.
Four Districts are designated which differ in the size and scale of commercial structures
accommodated in the district, the scale and mix of allowed commercial uses, and the location
of the district ill proximity to streets and highways.
10. ANALYSIS

a. Analysis of Facts Leading to Staff Recommendation
ANNEXATION ANALYSIS: Based on the policies and goals contained in the Comprehensive
Plan and the general compliance of the proposed development with the Zoning Ordinance, staff
believes that this is a good location for the proposed single family development. Please see
Exhibit D for detailed analysis of facts and findings.
The annexation legal description submitted with the application (prepared on December 22, 2005
by Jeffery McAllister, PLS) shows the property as contiguous to the existing corporate boulldary
of the City of Meridian.
Prior to the annexation ordinance approval, a Development Agreement (DA) shall be entered into
between the City of Meridian, property oWner (at the time of annexation ordinance adoption), and
the developer. The applicant shall contact the City Attorney. Bill Nary, at 888-4433 to initiate this
process within 18 months of City Council approval of the annexation request. The DA shall
incorporate the following:
• All future uses shall not involve uses, activities, processes, materials, equipment and
conditions of operation that will be detrimental to any persons, property or the general welfare by
reason of excessive production oftraftic, noise, smoke, fumes, glare or odors.
• All future development of the subject property shall be constructed in accordance with City
of Meridian ordinances in effect at the time of development.
\!
The applicant will be responsible for all costs associated with the sewer and water service
extension.
• Any existing domestic wells and/or septic systems within this project will have to be removed
from their domestic service, per City Ordinance Section 5-7-517, when services are available
from the City of Meridian. Wells may be used for non-domestic purposes such as landscape
irrigation.
@
Prior to issuance of any building permit, the subject property shall be sub~ivided in
accordance with the City of Meridian Unified Development Code.
() A 2S·foot wide commercial drive aisle, sewer, and water shall be stubbed to the property
located at 6175 N. Linder Road.

Knighthill Center Subdivision AZ-06-006, PP-06-005
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• Development of the property shall comply substantially with the conceptual site plan shown
on the preliminary plat dated January 5, 2006.
• The applicant shall provide sign age which indicates that there is an exit towards W.
Everest Lane.
• The applicant shall provide evidence of a recorded cross access easement with the
development to the west for access to W. Everest Lane. which is a private street.

PRELIMINARY PLAT ANALYSIS: Based on the policies and goals contained in the
Comprehensive Plan and the general compliance of the proposed development with the Zoning
Ordinance, staff believes that this is a good location for the proposed commercial development.
Please see Exhibit D for detailed analysis of facts and fmdings.
1. Right of way along Chinden: The submitted preliminary plat dated January 5, 2006
shows a 100-foot from centerline right-of-way on Chinden Road, which is consistent with
the Idaho Transportation Department's requirements along Chinden Road.
2. Conifers in Street Buffer along Linder and Chinden: The submitted landscape plan
shows coniferous trees located in the street buffer adjacent to Linder Road and Chinden
Road. Per UDC 11-3B-5C conifers are prohibited in street buffers, unless planted in the
middle of a buffer which is 20 feet wider, or wider. Please modify the landscape plan
prior to submittal of final plat to show conifers placed ONLY in the middle of the
required street buffer.
(

3.

Parking Lot Landscaping: Landscape plans shall be submitted with the Certificate of
Zoning Compliance applications for the development which comply with City Code.
Specifically, the submitted conceptual site plan does not provide landscape islands and
associated vegetation as required by UDC 11-3B-8C2.

4. Design Review: Per UDC 11-3A-19, the structures within the development shall be
subject to administrative design review and a Design Review application shall submitted
concurrently with the application for Certificate of Zoning Compliance.

5. Stub Streets: Staff is supportive of the connections to the two stub streets from the south
and west from Lochsa Falls Subdivision. The preliminary plat should be revised to show

a stubbed conunercial drive aisle and cross l\ccess easement to the north property line of
the property located to the south of the entrance off ofN. Linder Road, known as 6175 N.
Linder Road.

6. Pressure Irrigation: The City of Meridian requires that pressurized irrigation systems be
supplied by a year-round source of water. The applicant should be required to utilize any
existing surface or well water for the primary source. If a surface or well source is not
available, a single-point connection to the culinary water system shall be required. If a
single-point connection is utilized, the developer will be responsible for the payment of
assessments for the common areas prior to signature on the [mal plat by the City
Engineer. An underground, pressurized irrigation system should be installed to all
landscape areas per the approved specifications and in accordance with UDC 11-3A-15
and MCC 9-1-28.
7.

Common Areas: Maintenance of all conunon areas shall be the responsibi.1ity of the
Knighthill Center Business Owners' Association.

Kllighthill Center Subdivision AZ-06-006, PP-06-005
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8. Ditches. Laterals. and Canals: Per UDC 11-3A 6 all irrigation ditches, laterals or canals,
exclusive of natural waterways and waterways being used as amenities, that intersect,
.
cross or lie within the area being subdivided shall be covered.
a

11. EXHIBITS
A. Drawings

I. Preliminary Plat (dated; January 4,2006)
2. Landscape Plan (dated; January 5, 2006)
B. Conditions of Approval
1. Planning Department
2. Public Works Department
3. Fire Department
4. Police Department
5. Parks Department
6. Sanitary Service Company
7. Ada County Highway District
C. Legal Description
D. Required Findings from Zoning Ordinance

Krlighthill Centef Subdivision AZ-06-006, PP-OG-005
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A. Drawings
1. Preliminary Plat (dated: January 4,2006)
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2. Landscape Plan (dated: January 5, 2005)
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B. Conditions of Approval
1. PLANNING DEPARTMENT

ANNEXATION COMMENTS

l.l

Prior to the annexation ordinance approval, a Development Agreement (DA) shall be entered into
between the City of Meridian, property owner (at the time of annexation ordinance adoption), and
the developer. The applicant shall contact the City Attorney, Bill Nary, at 888-4433 to initiate this
process within 18 months of City Council approval of the annexation request. The DA shall
incorporate the following:
• All future uses shall not involve uses, activities, processes, materials, equipment and
conditions of operation that will be detrimental to any persons, property or the general
welfare by reason of excessive production of traffic, noise, smoke, fumes, gJare or odors.
• All future development of the subject property shall be constructed in accordance with City
of Meridian ordinances in effect at the time of development.
• The applicant will be responsible for all costs associated with the sewer and water service
extension.
• Any existing domestic wells andlor septic systems within this project will have to be removed
from their domestic service, per City Ordinance Section 5-7-517, when services are available
from the City of Meridian. Wells may be used for non-domestic purposes such as landscape
irrigation.
• Prior to issuance of any building penuit, the subject property be subdivided in accordance
with the City of Meridian Unified Development Code.
• A 25-foot wide commercial drive aisle, sewer, and water shall be stubbed to the property
located at 6175 N. Linder Road.
e Development of the property shall comply substantially with the conceptual site plan shown
on the preliminary plat dated January 5, 2006.
• The applicant shall provide signage which indicates that there is an exit towards W. Eyerest
Lane.
e The applicant shall provide evidence of a recorded cross access easement with the
devctloJlment to the west for access to W. Everest Lane. which is a private street.

•

1.2

That the applicant has offered. and shall provide, sidewalk along the landscape buffer
areas on the south side of the development and dp to EVerest Lane.

SITE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS-PRELIMINARY PLAT

1.2.1

The preliminary plat prepared by Toothman-Orton Engineering, dated January 4, 2006, is
approved, with the conditions listed herein. All comments/conditions of the accompanying
Annexation/Zoning (AZ-06-006) shall also be considered conditions of the Preliminary Plat (PP06-005).

1.2.2

Maintenance of all common areas shall be the responsibility ofthe Knighthill Center Subdivision
Business Owner's Association.

1.2.3

The applicant shall modify the plat to include a cross access/parking easement for all lots within
the subdivision.

1.2.4

The preliminary plat shall be modified to reflect the conditions contained in this report .and 10
copies shall be submitted no later than 10 days prior to the City Council hearing on the
applications.
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1.2.5

The landscape plan shall be modified to reflect the conditions contained in this report and the
,- revised preliminary plat and shall be submitted with the final plat app1i.cation.

1.2.6

Modify the landscape plan prior to submittal of final plat to show conifers placed ONLY in the
middle of the required street buffer along Chin den Road and Linder Road.

1.2.7

Landscape plans shall be submitted with the Certificate of Zoning Compliance applications fot
the development which comply with City Code. Specifically, the submitted conceptual site plan
does not provide landscape islands and associated vegetation as required by UDC 11-3B-8C2.

1.2.8

Per UDC 11-3A-19, the structures within the development shall be subject to administrative
design review and a Design Review application shall submitted concurrently with the application
for Certificate of Zoning Compliance.

1.2.9

The preliminary plat shall be revised to provide a stubbed 25-foot wide commercial drive aisle
and cross access easement to the north property line of the property known as 6175 N. Linder
Road.

1.2.10 All areas approved as open space shall be free of wet ponds or other such nuisances. All
stormwater detention facilities incorporated into the approved open space are subject to UDC 113A-18 and shall be fully vegetated with grass and trees. Sand, gravel or other non-vegetated
surface materials shall not be used in open space lots, except as permitted under UDC 11-3B. If
the stormwater detention facility cannot be incorporated into the approved open space and still
meet the standards of UOC 11-3A-18, then the applicant shall relocate the facility. This may
require losing a developable lot or developable area. It is the responsibility of the
developer to comply with ACRO, City of Meridian and aU other regulatory requirements at the
time of final construction.
1.2.11 Where the applicant has submitted a preliminary landscape plan and where staff has reviewed
such plan, the landscaping shall be consistent with the preliminary plan with modifications as
proposed by staff.
1.2.12 Per UDC 11-3A-6 all irrigation ditches, laterals or canals, exclusive of natural waterways and
waterways being used as amenities, that intersect, cross or lie within the area being subdivided
shall be covered.
1.3

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS-PRELIMINARY PLAT

1.3.1

Sidewalks shaH be installed within the subdivision and on the perimeter of the subdivision
pursuant to UDC 11-3A-17.

1.3.2

The City of Meridian requires that pressurized irrigation systems be supplied by a year-round
source of water (MCC 12-13-8.3). The applicant should be required to utilize any existing surface
or well water for the primary source. If a surface or well source is not available, a single-point
connection to the culinary water system shall be required. If a single-point connection' is utilized,
the developer will be responsible for the payment of assessments for the common areas prior to
signature on the final plat by the City Engineer. An underground, pressurized irrigation system
should be installed to all landscape areas per the approved specifications and in accordance with
UOC 11-3A-15 and MCC 9-1-28.

1.3.3

A detailed landscape plan, in compliance with the landscape and subdivision ordinance and as
noted in this repOlt, shall be submitted for the subdivision with the final plat application.

1.3.4

The applicant shall submit a detailed fencing plan with the final plat applicatir;mfor the
subdivision. If pennanent fencing is not provided, temporary construction fencing to contain
debris must be installed around the perimeter prior to issuance of a building pemnt. All fences
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should taper down to 3 feet maximum within 20 feet of all right-of.way. All fencing should be
installed in accordance with UDC 11~3AQ7.

13.5

Any tree over 4" in caliper that is removed from the property shall be replaced by installing
additional trees, being the equivalent number of caliper inches of trees that were removed.
Required landscaping trees will not be considered as replacement trees for those trees that have to
be mitigated.

1.3.6

All irrigation ditches, laterals o{ canals, exclusive of the Ten Mile Stub Drain, intersecting,
crossing or lying adjacent and contiguous to the area being subdivided shall be tiled per UDC 113A-6, unless otherwise approved by Nampa Meridian Irrigation District. Plans will need to be
approved by the appropriate irrigation/drainage district, or lateral users association (ditch
owners), with wdtten approval or non-approval submitted to the Public Works Department. If
lateral users association approval can not be obtained, alternate plans will be reviewed and
approved by the City Engineer prior to final plat signature.

1.3.7

Staffs failure to cite specific ordinance provisions or terms of the approved
annexation/conditional use does not relieve the applicant of responsibility for compliance.

1.3.8

Preliminary plat approval shall be subject to the expiration provisions set forth in UDC 11-6B-7.

2. PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
2.1

Sanitary sewer service to this development is being proposed via extension of mains in N.Gertie
Place and W. Everest Lane. The applicant shall install all mains necessary to provide service;
applicant shall coordinate main size and rquting with the Public Works Department, and execute
standard fOims of easements for any mains that are required to provide service. Minimum cover
over sewer mains is three feet, if cover from top of pipe to sub-grade is less than three feet than
alternate materials shall be used in conformance with the City of Meridian Public Works
Departments Standard Specifications.

2.2

Water service to this site is being proposed via extension of mains in W. Everest Lane and N.
Gertie Place. The applicant shall be responsible to install water mains to and through this
development, coordinate main size and routing with Public Works, and execute standard forms of
easements for any mains that are required to provide service.

2.3 .

The preliminary plat indicates all new water mains will be eight-inch. Th.e applicant shall be
required to install a twelve-inch main from the twelve-inch main in W. Everett to Linder Road,
with a connection to the twelve inch main located to the south of this project in Linder Road. The
shall be in lieu of running water main in the arterial frontages.

(

2.4

The applicant shall provide a 20-foot easement for all public water/sewer mains outside of public
right of way (include all water services and hydrants).

2.5

A pressurized irrigation system is required for all subdivisions per UDC 11-3A-1S. The applicant
has not indicated who will own and operate the pressure irrigation system in this proposed
development. lfit is to be maintained as a private system, plans and specifications will be
reviewed by the Public Works Department as part of the construction plan review. A "draft
copy" of the operations and maintenance manual will be required prior to plan approval with the
"final draft" being required prior to final plat signature on the last phase of this project.

If it is to be owned and maintained by an Irrigation District then evidence of a license agreement
shall be submitted prior to schedUling of a pre-construction meeting.

2.6

ExllibitB

The City of Meridian requires that pressurized irrigation systems be supplied by a year-round
source of water (UDC 11-3A-6). The applicant should be required to use any existing surface or
well water for the primary source. If a surface or well source is not available, a singleopoint
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connection to the culinary water system shall be required. Ifa single-point connection is utilized,
the developer will be responsible for the payment of assessments for the common areas prior to
signature on the final plat by the City Engineer.
2.7

Any existing domestic wells andlor septic systems within this project shall be removed from
domestic service per City Ordinance Section 9-1-4 and 9·4-8. Wells may be used for nondomestic purposes such as landscape irrigation.

2.8

All irrigation ditches, laterals or canals, exclusive of natural waterways, intersecting, crossing or
lying adjacent and contiguous to the area being subdivided shall be tiled per UDC 11-3A-6.
Plans shall be approved by the appropriate irrigation/drainage district, or lateral users association
(ditch owners), with written approval or non-approval submitted to the Public Works Department.
Iflateral users association approval can't be obtained, alternate plans shaH be reviewed and
approved by the Meridian City Engineer prior to final plat signature.

2.9

A drainage plan designed by a State of Idaho licensed architect or engineer is required and shan
be submitted to the City Engineer (Ord. 557, 10-1-91) for all off-street parking areas. Storm water
treatment and disposal shall be designed in accordance with Department of Enviromnental
Quality 1997 publication Catalog of Storm Water Best Management Practices for Idaho Cities
and Counties and City of Meridian standards and policies. Off-site disposal into surface water is
prohibited unless the jurisdiction which has authority over the receiving stream provides written
authorization prior to development plan approval. The applicant is responsible for filing all
necessary applications with the Idaho Department of Water Resources regarding Shallow
Injection Wells.

2. J 0

Street signs are to be in place, water system shall be approved and activated, fencing installed,
drainage lots constructed, road base approved and the Final Plat for this subdivision shall be
recorded, prior to applying for building permits.

2.11

A letter of credit or cash surety in the amount of 110% will be required for all uncompleted
fencing, landscaping, amenities, pressurized iuigation, sanitary sewer, water, etc., prior to
signature on the final plat.

2.12

All development improvements, including but not limited to sewer, fencing, micro-paths,
pressurized irrigation and landscaping shall be installed and approved prior to obtaining
certificates of occupancy.

2.13

Applicant shall be required to pay Public Works development plan review, and construction
inspection fees, as determined during the plan review process, prior to signature on the fmal plat
per Resolution 02-374.

2.14

It shall be the responsibility ofthe applicant to ensure that all development features comply with
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act.

2.15

Applicant shall be responsible for application and compliance with and NPDES Permitting that
may be required by the Environmental Protection Agency.

2.16

Applicant shall be responsible for application and compliance with any Section 404 Permitting
that may be required by the Army Corps ofEngilleers.

2.17

The engineer shall be required to certify that the street centerline elevations are set a minimum of
3-feet above the highest established peak groundwater elevation.

3. FIRE DEPARTMENT
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1. Acceptance of the water supply for fire protection will be by the Meridian Fire Department
and water quality by the Meridian Water Department for bacteria testing.
2. Final Approval of the fire hydrant locations shall be by the Meridian Fire Department.
a. Fire Hydrants shall have the 4 W' outlet face the main street or parking lot aisle.
b. The Fire hydrant shall not face a street which does not have addresses on it.
c. Fire hydrant markers shall be provided per Public Works specifications.
d. Fire Hydrants shall be placed on comers when spacing permits.
e. Fire hydrants shall not have any vertical obstructions to outlets within 10'.
f. Fire hydrants shall be place 18" above finish grade.
g. Fire hydrants shall be provided to meet the requirements of the IFC Section 509.5.
h. Show all proposed or existing hydrants for all new construction or additions to
. existing buildings within 1,000 feet of the project.
3. All entrance and internal roads and alleys shall have a turning radius of28' inside and 48'
outside radius.
4. All common driveways shall be straight or have a turning radius of 28' inside and 48'
outside and shall have a clear driving surface which is 20' wide.
5. Provide a 20-foot wide Fire Lane for all internal roadways all roadways shall be marked
in accordance with Appendix D Section DI03.6 Signs.
6. For all Fire Lanes, provide sign age "No Parking Fire Lane".
7. Insure that all yet undeveloped parcels are maintained free of combustible vegetation.
8. Fire lanes and streets shall have a vertical clearance of 13'6". This includes mature
landscaping.
9. Operational fire hydrants, temporary or permanent street signs and access roads with an all
weather surface are required before combustible construction is brought on site.
10. Building setbacks shall be per the International Building Code for one and two story
construction.
11. The roadways shall be built to Ada County Highway Standards cross section
requirements and shall have a clear driving surface, available at all times, which is 20'
wide. Streets with less than a 29' street width shall have no parking. Streets with less
than 33' shall have parking only on one side. These measurements shall be based on the
face of curb dimension. The roadway shall be able to accommodate an imposed load of
75,000 GVW.
12. Commercial and office occupancies will require a fire-flow consistent with the
Intemational Fire Code to service the proposed project. Fire hydrants shall be placed per
Appendix D.
13. The fire department requests that any future signalization installed as the result of the
development of this project be equipped with Opticom Sensors to ensure a safe and
efficient response by fire and emergency medical servic.e vehicles. This cost of this
installation is to be borne by the developer.
14. Maintain a separation of5' from the building to the dumpster enclosure.
15. Provide a Knox box entry system for the complex prior to occupancy.
16. The first digit of the Apartment/Office Suite shall correspond to the floor level.
17. The applicant shall work with Planning Department staff to provide an address identification
plan and a sign which meets the requirements of the City of Meridian sign ordinance at the
required intersection(s).
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18. All portions of the buildings located on this project must be within 150' of a paved surface
as measured around the perimeter ofthe bUilding.
19. Provide exterior egress lighting as required by the International Building & Fire Codes.
20. There shall be a fire hydrant within 100' of all Fire Department connections.
4. POLICE DEPARTMENT

1. The Police Department would like the proposed financial institution relocated from the
northeast comer of the site to the southeast comer of the site for better police visibility
and approach.
5. PARKS DEPARTMENT

1. The Parks Department has no concerns with the site design as submitted with the
application.
6. SANITARY /iERVICE COMPANY
1. Please contact Bill Gregory at SSC (888-3999) for detailed review of your proposal and

submit stamped (approved) plans with your certificate of zoning compliance application.
7.

ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT

Site Specific Conditions ofAppro val

1. Dedicate a total of 48-feet of right-of-way from the centerline of Linder Road abutting the parcel
by means of a warranty deed. The right-of-way purchase and sale agreement and deed must be
completed and signed by the applicant prior to scheduling the final plat for signature by the
ACHD Commission or prior to issuance of a building permit (or other required permits),
whichever occurs first. Allow up to 30 business days to process the right-of-way dedication after
receipt of all requested material. The owner will be paid the fair market value of the right·of-way
dedicated which is an addition to existing ACHD right-of-way.
2. Construct a 5-foot detached concrete sidewalk abutting the site on Linder Road. The sidewalk
shall be located a minimum of 41-feet from the centerline of the roadway. The applicant should
work with ACHD and the landowner of the out-parcel that fronts on Linder Road to extend a
continuous sidewalk to the intersection of Linder Road and Chinden Boulevard.
3. Construct a northbound left-turn lane on Linder Road at the site access intersection.
4. Construct a curb return full access driveway on Linder Road located at the south property line
(approximately 600-feet south of Chinden Boulevard), as proposed. construct a separate left and
right turn lane for the eastbound (exiting) approach.
5. Comply with the requirements of the Idaho Transportation Department for right-of-way, access,
and improvements to Chinden Boulevard (US 20/26).
6. Connect to Gertie Place, a public stub street at the south property line, as proposed.
7. Connect to Everest Street, a private street at the west property line, as proposed.
8. Provide a cross-access easement to the O.6-acre out-parcel to the south, as proposed.
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9. Other than the access specifically approved with this application, direct lot access is prohibited to
Linder Road and shall be noted on the fmal plat.
10. Comply with all Standard Conditions of Approval.
Standard Conditions o(Approval

I. Any existing in'igation facilities shall be relocated outside of the right~of.way.
2. Private sewer or water systems are prohibited from being located within any ACHD roadway or
right-of-way.
3. All utility relocation costs associated with improving street frontages abutting the site shall be
borne by the developer.
4.

Replace any existing damaged curb, gutter and sidewalk and any that may be damaged during the
constmction of the proposed development. Contact Construction Services at 387-6280 (with file
number) for details.

5. Comply with the District's Tree Planter Width Interim Policy.
6. Utility street cuts in pavement less than five years old are not allowed unless approved in writing
by the District. Contact the District's Utility Coordinator at 387-6258 (with file numbers) for
details.
7. All design and construction shall be in accordance with the Ada County Highway District Policy
Manual, ISPWC Standards and approved supplements, Constmction Services procedures and all
applicable ACHD Ordinances unless specifically waived herein. An engineer registered in the
State ofIdaho shall prepare and certify all improvement plans.
8. The applicant shall submit revised plans for staff approval, prior to issuance of building permit
(or other required pennits), which incorporates any required design changes.
9. Construction, use and property development shall be in conformance with all applicable
requirements of the Ada County Highway District prior to District approval for occupancy.
10. Payment of applicable road impact fees are required prior to building construction in accordance
with Ordinance #200, also known as Ada County Highway District Road Impact Fee Ordinance.
11. It is the responsibility of the applicant to verify all existing utilities within the right-of-way. The
applicant at no cost to ACHD shall repair existing utilities damaged by the applicant. The
applicant shall be required to call DIOLINE (1-800-342-1585) at least two full business days
prior to breaking ground within ACHD right-of-way. The applicant shall contact ACHD Traffic
Operations 387-6190 in the event any ACHD conduits (spare or filled) are compromised during
any phase of construction.
12. No change in the terms and conditions of this approval shall be valid unless they are in writing
and signed by the applicant or the applicant's authorized representative and an authorized'
representative of the Ada County Highway District. The burden shall be upon the applicant to
obtain written confirmation of any change from the Ada County Highway District.
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13. Any change by the applicant in the planned use of the property which is the subject of this
application, shall require the applicant to comply with all rules, regulations, ordinances, plans, or
other regulatory and legal restrictions in force at the time the applicant or its successors in interest
advises the Highway District of its intent to change the planned use ofthe subject property unless
a waiver/variance of said requirements or other legal relief is granted pursuant to the law in effect
at the time the change in use is sought.
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D. Required Findings from Zoning Ordinance
1. Annexation Findings:

Upon recommendation from the Commission, the Council shall make a filII investigation
and shall, at the public hearing, review the application. In order to grant an annexation
and/or rezone, the Council shall make the following tIn dings:

t.

The map amendment complies with the applicable provisions of the comprehensive
plan;
The applicant is proposing to zone all of the subject property to C-G. City Council fmds
that the proposed zoning map amendment complies with the applicable provisions of the
comprehensive plan. Please see Comprehensive Ptan Policies and Goals, Section 8, of the
Staff Report.

2.

The map amendment complies with the regulations outlined for the proposed
district, specifically the purpose statement;

City Council finds that retail, restaurant, and financial institution uses are allowed within
the requested zoning district of C-G as a Principally Pemlitted Use. The accompanying
plat demonstrates the land wilJ be developed with lot sizes and other dimensional
requirements that conform to the proposed zoning designation.
3.

The map amendment shall not be materially detrimental to the public health, safety,
and welfare;
City Council finds that the proposed zoning amendment will not be detrimental to the
public health, safety, or welfare.

4.

The map amendment shall not result in an adverse impact upon the delivery of
services by any political subdivision providing public services within the City
including, but not limited to, school districts; and,
.
City CO\.l11cil finds that the proposed zoning amendment will not r.esult in any adverse
impact upon the delivery of services by any political subdivision providing services to
this site.

5.

The annexation is in the best of interest of the City (UDC 11-5B-3.E).
J • •"

City Council finds that all essential services are available or will be provided by the
developer to the subject property and will not require unreasonable expenditure of public
funds. The applicant is proposing to develop the land in general compliance with the
City's Comprehensive Plan. This is a logical expansion of the City limits. In accordance
with the findings listed above, City Council finds that Annexation and Zon:ii1g of this
property to C-G would be in the best interest of the City.
2. Preliminary Plat Findings:
In consideration of a preliminary plat, combined preliminary and final plat, or short plat,
the dedsionomaking body shall make the following findings:
1.

•

I

The plat is in conformance with the Comprehensive Plan;
City Council finds that the proposed application is in substantial compliance with the
adopted Comprehensive Plan. City Council generally supports the proposed plat layout as
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it complies with the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan. Please see Comprehensive
Plan Policies and Goals, Section 8, of the Staff Report.

2.

Public services are available or can be made available and are adequate to
accommodate the proposed development;
City Council finds that public services are available to accorrunodate the proposed
development. (See finding Items 3 and 4 above under Annexation Findings for more
details.)

3.

The plat is in conformance with scheduled public improvements in accord with the
City's capital improvement program;
Because the developer is installing sewer, water, and utilities for the development at their
cost, City Council finds that the subdivision will not require the expenditure of capital
improvement funds.

4.

There is public financial capability of supporting services for the proposed
development;
See finding "Items 3 and 4 above under Annexation Findings above, and the Agency
Comments and Conditions in Exhibit B for more detail.

5.

The development will not be detrimental to the public health, safety or general
welfare; and
City Council is not aware of any health, safety or environmental problems associated
with the development of this subdivision that should be brought to the Council or
Commission's attention. ACHD considers road safety issues in their analysis.

6.

The development preserves significant natural, scenic or historic features.
City Council is unaware of any natural, scenic or historic features on this site. Therefore,
City Council finds that the proposed development will not result in the destruction, loss
or damage of any natural, scenic or historic feature(s) of major importance.

Exhibit D

